


































































This report is a valuation of Ferrari N.V. prepared as a Master’s in Finance Final Work 
Project at ISEG, following the format recommended by the CFA Institute for Equity 
Research reports. The study was conducted considering publicly available data on 
October 07th, 2020, and diverse sources of information were used, such as company 
reports, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg L.P., yahoofinance.com. Novelties after this 
date were not included. The target price (TP) was achieved based on the DCF method, 
complemented with Adjusted Present Value, Economic Value Added and Relative 
Valuation. The TP of €177.48 (2020YE) represents an upside potential of 17% over 
the close price of July 30, 2020, and the final recommendation for Ferrari N.V. is BUY, 
with medium risk assessed.  
JEL Classification: L62; L67. 
 
Keywords: Equity Research; Valuation; Ferrari; Discounted Cash Flows; Economic 




Este relatório é uma avaliação da Ferrari N.V., preparada como Projeto de Trabalho 
Final de Mestrado em Finanças pelo ISEG. O trabalho segue o formato recomendado 
pelo Instituto CFA. A avaliação foi conduzida considerando dados disponíveis 
publicamente em 07 de outubro de 2020, e diversas fontes de informação foram 
utilizadas, como relatórios da empresa, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg L.P., 
yahoofinance.com. Novidades após essa data não estão contempladas na análise. O 
preço alvo de €177.48 (dezembro de 2020) representa um potencial de valorização 
de 17% em relação ao preço de fechamento de 30 de julho de 2020, e a 
recomendação para a Ferrari N.V. é COMPRA, com risco médio avaliado.  
Classificação JEL: L62; L67. 
Palavras-chave: Equity Research; Avaliação; Ferrari; Fluxos de Caixa Descontados; 





These two years as a Social Scientist studying finance were pretty challenging for me, 
most of the contents were completely new, and to see the operations of a company 
based on financials was a difficult task. However, many wonderful people were by my 
side supporting during this process. In so, I would like to thank my friends from ISEG 
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in this learning process. I lived around the campus and ISEG has deeply been part of 
my life in the past semesters. So, I felt a lot the importance of the campus staff, and I 






Abstract                                                                                                                       ii 
Resumo                                                                                                                      iii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                   iv 
List of Figures                                                                                                             v 
List of Tables                                                                                                           viii 
1. Research Snapshot                                                                                                1 
2. Business Description                                                                                             2 
3. Management and Corporate Governance                                                            5 
4. Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning                                                 6 
5. Investment Summary                                                                                           11 
6. Valuation                                                                                                               12 
7. Financial Analysis                                                                                                15 
8. Investment Risks                                                                                                  19 
9. Appendices                                                                                                             1 
Appendix 1: Statement of Financial Position 2 
Appendix 2: Income Statement 2 
Appendix 3: Cash Flow Statement 3 
Appendix 4: Key Financial Ratios 4 
Appendix 5: Common-Size Statement of Financial Position 5 
Appendix 6: Common-Size Income Statement 6 
Appendix 7: Forecasting Assumptions 7 
Appendix 8: Summary of Valuation Models 11 










List of Figures 
Figure 1. Ferrari & Auto Peers – Performance and Return (2019) 2 
Figure 2. Ferrari & Luxury Peers – Performance and Return (2019) 2 
Figure 3. Ferrari’s performance against EUROSTOXX 600 (2Y, normalized) 3 
Figure 4. Enzo Ferrari, 1964 3 
Figure 5. Ferrari’s IPO – Italian Stock Exchange, Milan, 2015 3 
Figure 6. Ferrari’s Store – Inclusiveness and Diversification with Luxury Industry 4 
Figure 7. Ferrari – Revenues per Business Segment 4 
Figure 8. Ferrari – Historical Stable Growth in Shipments 4 
Figure 9. Ferrari – Revenues per Car Strategic Category 5 
Figure 10. Ferrari’s 2019-2022 Business Plan 5 
Figure 11. Ferrari – Geographic Segmentation 5 
Figure 12. Ferrari – Evolution of Average Revenue from C&SP per Unit Delivered 5 
Figure 13. Ferrari – Key Drivers of Expenses as % of Net Revenues 6 
Figure 14. Ferrari and LPCI: Historical Production in Units 6 
Figure 15. Ferrari – Major Shareholders 7 
Figure 16. Ferrari – Advances in gender equality 7 
Figure 17. Ferrari and Peers: Historical Production in Units 8 
Figure 18. Ferrari and Peers: Revenues and HNWIs Population Growth (in bn for currencies) 8 
Figure 19. Ferrari and Peers: The Geography of Competition (2019) 9 
Figure 20. Ferrari and Peers: Average Revenue Per Unit Sold 9 
Figure 21. HNWIs Population Evolution Per Geography (in mn) 10 
Figure 22. Ferrari’s S90 Stradale, 1st Indtroduced Plug-in Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019 10 
Figure 23. Lamborghini’s Sian, 1st Introduced Plug-in Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019 10 
Figure 24. McLaren’s P1 GTR, 1st Introduced Plug-in Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019 11 
Figure 25. Aston Martin’s Valkyrie, hybrid model, unveiled in 2019 11 
Figure 26. Ferrari – Porter Five Forces Analysis 11 
Figure 27. Ferrari and peers: SWOT - Strengths 12 
Figure 28. Ferrari and Peers: SWOT - Weaknesses 12 
Figure 29. Ferrari and peers: SWOT – Opportunities 13 
Figure 30. Ferrari and peers: SWOT – Threats 13 
Figure 31. Ferrari Roma: 2020 winner of the Car Design Award 14 
Figure 32. Ferrari is awarded in 2020 the Word’s Strongest Brand, second year in a row 14 
Figure 33. Ferrari – SWOT Analysis 15 
Figure 34. Ferrari – Target Price Per Model and Upside Potential 16 
Figure 35. Ferrari – Revenue per business segment – actual and forecasted (in € bn and %) 16 
Figure 36. Ferrari – Shipments (units), Revenues (€ mn) and EBIT (€ mn) 17 
Figure 37. Ferrari – CAPEX and R&D (€ mn) 17 
Figure 38. Ferrari – Cash Flows from Operating, Financing and Investing Activities, actual and 
forecasted (in thousands) 17 
 
viii 
Figure 39. Ferrari – Production per strategic pillar – actual and forecasted, in thousands 20 
Figure 40. Ferrari – EBITDA and Net Profit Margin – Actual and Forecasted (€ bn) 21 
Figure 41. Ferrari – Forecasted P&L 21 
Figure 42. Ferrari – Revenue, EBIT, Net Profit Margin & FCFF 22 
Figure 43. Distribution of Prices for Different WACCs and Terminal Growth Rates – Monte Carlo 
Simulation 22 






List of Tables 
Table 1. Stock Data 1 
Table 2. Ferrari's Key Metrics and Multiples (Forecasted) 1 
Table 3. Ferrari's Target Price per Model Applied 1 
Table 4. Ferrari's ESG Score 7 
Table 5. Ferrari's Key Metrics and Multiples (Forecasted) 16 
Table 6. Ferrari, Auto and Luxury Multiples 19 
Table 7. Ferrari and Luxury Peers Multiples 18 
Table 8. Ferrari – WACC Assumptions 19 
Table 9. Ferrari – DCF – FCFF Valuation (€ Thousand) 19 
Table 10. Ferrari – Adjusted Present Value Valuation (€ Thousand) 20 
Table 11. Ferrari – Economic Value Added (€ Thousand) 20 
Table 12. Ferrari – Sensitivity Analysis with WACC and g 22 











We issue a BUY recommendation to Ferrari N.V. and a target price (TP) of 
€177.48 for 2020YE, which implies an upside potential of 17% over the 
closing price of €153 from July 30, 2020 according to our DCF (FCFF) 
model. Additionally, a TP of €178 and €175 was obtained with APV and EVA 
models, respectively, supporting the DCF buy recommendation. Relative 
Valuation with the multiple P/E 2021E (luxury peers) outputs a TP of 
€176.43, also close to the TP obtained with the other methods.  
 
Covid-19 impacted 2020E production, but did not change upward sales 
trend 
Ferrari is the most iconic luxury brand in the world, recognized for delivering 
innovation, state-of-the-art performance and distinction in design and 
engineering. Cars delivered grew at a 10% CAGR between 2017-2019, 
growth trend applied in our forecast of units produced between 2020E-
2022E, without considering the impact of COVID-19 outbreak. The growth 
in sales has been supported by investments in expansion associated with 
Ferrari’s Business Plan 2018-2022, which includes pursuing a broader 
variety of cars and higher sales volumes in each car category (controlled 
growth), enabling pricing power. Between 2023E-2024E, after the current 
business plan is completed, the production of cars was forecasted to grow 
at 7% YoY, in line with the growth average between 2015-2018, before the 
current business plan. Furthermore, it is likely that Ferrari will still hold an 
enhanced portfolio of cars in the 2023E-2024E period, since models have 
an average life cycle of four years, and twelve new models are expected to 
be unveiled between 2020E-2022E (historically Ferrari launched two models 
per year, which tends to reoccur in for 2023E-2024E, independently of the 
next business plan vision). 
With all the industrial facilities concentrated in Maranello, Italy, Ferrari 
ceased the operations between March and May 2020, when lockdowns were 
imposed due to the Covid-19 outbreak. According to our forecast, Ferrari 
would produce around 11,144 cars in 2020E without the impact of Covid-19. 
The break in production decreased Ferrari’s capacity of delivering 1,500 
units in 2020E, and the total production for the year is expected to be 9,644 
units, 5% lower than the 10,131 units produced in 2019. However, Ferrari’s 
assessment on waiting lists for recent launched cars, or still to be unveiled, 
shows demand “as strong as ever”1, and the prospected sales remain on the 
pre-Covid-19 route2.  
 
1 Ferrari’s assessment on COVID-19 impact on 2020Q2: “earnings weak across all metrics but 
in line with expectations. Sound core business confirming solid profit resilience. Covid-19 
pandemic disruption delayed the industrialization phase of the SF90 Stradale. Deliveries to 
commence in Q4 2020. Vibrant demand strengthening the order book. Restart of pre-
owned market sustains residual values. Obtained the equal salary certification on July 2 
underlying the Company’s attention to merit”.  










TP €177 (17% upside potential)  
 
Table 1. Stock Data   
Price €153  
Target Price €178 
Upside Potential 16% 
Dividend Yield 0.7% 
Total Shareholder Return 17% 
Italian Stock Exchange 
(ISE) 
RACE.MI  
NYSE RACE.N  
Market Cap € mn 30,540 
52-weeks range € 169.05-
115.12 
Free-Float 69% 
Average Daily Volume 
(ISE, 2Y data) 
525,741 
Average Daily Volume 
(NYSE, 2Y data) 
430,918 





Table 2. Ferrari's Key Metrics and Multiples 
(Forecasted) 
Multiples 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
P/E 55.18 38.95 27.14 24.29 19.52 
P/EBIT 39.61 28.19 19.75 17.77 14.21 
EV/EBIT 45.93 32.69 22.91 20.61 16.47 
EV/Sales 9.8 8.18 6.68 6.05 5.41 
Key-
Metrics 
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
Revenue
s (€ bn) 
3.4 4.07 4.98 5.5 6.15 
EBIT (€ 
bn) 
0.72 1.02 1.45 1.61 2.02 
Net Profit 
Margin 
15% 18% 21% 21% 24% 
EPS (€) 2.77 3.93 5.64 6.25 7.84 





Table 3. Ferrari's Target Price per Model Applied 
  TP Upside 
DCF – FCFF €177 16% 
DCF – APV €178 16% 
DCF – EVA €175 14% 
Multiples 
Valuation (P/E 
2021E – Lux 
Peers) 
€176 15% 






The most diversified portfolio of cars ever, with high prospects for 
premiums  
Ferrari has the highest revenue per car compared with peers, and this is one 
of the main triggers sustaining growth in the coming years. Revenues from 
the sale of cars are expected to evolve within a mix of i. growth in 
customization, achieving 760 customized vehicles in 2024E (19% CAGR 
between 2020E-2024E, pushed by Ferrari’s design centers recently opened 
in strategic markets, and an average premium of 50% on the base price); ii. 
Hybridization – Plug-in technology, which will be present in 60% of the 
models by 2022E and brings an average premium of 22% over the base 
price (Appendix 07); and iii. Controlled growth, with new car categories in 
GT, Sport, Special Series and Icona strategic pillars, and higher sales 
volumes per model. Ferrari’s SUV, Purosangue, represents a new model 
within GT pillar. Icona Series, which selling price starts at €1,500,000 without 
customizations, represented less than 1% of total vehicles sold in 2019 and 
is projected to achieve 5% in 2024E). Between 2014-2019, revenues per 
unit grew at an average rate of 4% YoY, indicating Ferrari’s resilience in 
charging high premiums for the novelties.  
 
Beyond car jewels, towards broader luxury: ultra-exclusive and more 
inclusive 
Besides luxury performance cars (LPC), Ferrari is investing to expand to the 
broader luxury market, offering personal luxury goods such as watches, 
jackets, eyewear, collectibles, in physical and online stores. This strategy 
aims to sustain the brand aura of high luxury by achieving a broader potential 
market, not restricted only to HNWIs 3 , embracing more Formula 1 fan 
communities with luxury, but more accessible goods. This source of 
revenues is estimated to grow at 6% YoY from 2021E:2024E, average 
growth of personal luxury goods industry between 2012-2019 (Bain & 
Company), after a sharp fall of 50% of revenues in 2020E due to the Covid-
19 impact in Formula 1, stores and amusement parks.  
 
Waiting Lists: Demand is under Ferrari’s control and cash flows are 
stable 
Although Ferrari’s sales are highly correlated with the growth in HNWIs 
population, new launches are the real engine of demand. We predict units 
produced growing at an 8% CAGR between 2020E-2024E, in line with the 
past three years CAGR. Ferrari’s capacity of controlling demand depends 
on scarcity, that is, demand far exceeding offer. Based on the firm’s track-
records, we believe that Ferrari will be capable of matching demand and 
offer on the forecasted period in such a way that the firm will sustain 
controlled growth until 2024E, with high chance of keeping the pole-position 
in obtaining the highest premiums per unit in the market. The capacity of 
managing the demand according to its willingness makes Ferrari able to 
have more predictable cash flows.   
 





3 HNWIs are defined by Capgemini as those individuals having investable assets of US$1 
million or more, excluding primary residence, collectibles, and consumer durables. 
Figure 1. Ferrari & Auto Peers – Performance and 
Return (2019) 
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Figure 2. Ferrari & Luxury Peers – Performance and 
Return (2019) 
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3 
At a first glance it makes sense to compare Ferrari with automotive peers. 
However, Ferrari’s multiples are incomparable with car manufacturer’s 
averages, even including outliers such as the U.S. Tesla or the G.B. Aston 
Martin. Compared with luxury peers, Ferrari’s margins and multiples still 
outstand, reflecting on the company’s leading position as a luxury brand, 
capable of charging the highest premiums in the industry, an important 






















Founded in 1929 by Mr. Enzo Ferrari, the firm was initially a racing team, 
Scuderia Ferrari, based in Modena, Italy. On that time, Scuderia Ferrari 
raced with Alfa Romeo cars. In 1947, Mr. Enzo moved his headquarters from 
Modena to Maranello, where the firm is still located. That’s also the year 
when Ferrari produced its first racing car, becoming the company currently 
known. In 1950, the company began racing in the Formula 1 World 
Championship, which makes Scuderia Ferrari the longest running Formula 
1 team. In 1969, Fiat Crysler Group (FCG) acquired a 50% stake in Ferrari 
S.p.A., and in 1988 increased the stake to 90%, following the death of Mr. 
Enzo Ferrari. His son, Mr. Piero, owned the remaining 10%.  
In 2016, Ferrari became an independent publicly traded company, following 
its separation from FCG. Ferrari promoted its IPO, offering common shares 
at the New York Stock Exchange, under the ticker symbol RACE. The 
Company also listed its common shares on the Mercato Telematico 
Azionario, the stock exchange managed by Borsa Italiana, under the same 
ticker symbol.  
 
Company Profile 
Ferrari ranks among the world’s leading luxury brands, focused on the 
design, production and sales of the world’s most recognizable luxury 
performance sports cars. As a brand, Ferrari’s image symbolizes exclusivity, 
innovation, state-of-the-art sport performance and Italian design and 
engineering heritage. Concentrating design, engineer and productions of its 
cars in Maranello, Ferrari sells in 60 markets worldwide, and had as 
December 2019 a network of 166 authorized dealers, operating 187 points 
of sales.  
Figure 4. Enzo Ferrari, 1964 
 
Source: Observador.pt. 
Figure 5. Ferrari’s IPO – Italian Stock Exchange, 
Milan, 2015 
 
Source: Reuters.  
Figure 3. Ferrari’s performance against EUROSTOXX 600 (2Y, normalized) 
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4 
Ferrari’s has a dual mission when dealing with the volumes produced: To 
maintain its aura of exclusiveness and achieve premiums, Ferrari keeps a 
strategy of low volume production, which is key for sustaining the reputation 
of scarcity and exclusiveness among its customers. On the other hand, the 
firm has been growing and delivering record units, which is set to continue 
on the coming years. To achieve a balance, Ferrari carefully manages the 
production volumes and delivery waiting lists, having a strong control on the 
demand.  
Besides cars, Ferrari has been diversifying in the luxury industry. Its strength 
as a brand allows the company to license it to a selected number of 
producers and retailers of luxury and lifestyle goods, which includes 
sportswear, watches, accessories, consumer electronics and 
theme/entertainment parks. Ferrari also designs, sources and sells Ferrari-
branded products through a network of 20 Ferrari-owned stores and 24 
franchised stores, and on its website. Financial services are also provided 
to retail clients for the purchases of cars and dealers, through the operations 
of Ferrari Financial Services, mainly in the U.S. market. Finally, the company 
also supplies engines for other high luxury car manufacturers, such as 
Maserati, and provide services for existing Ferrari owners.  
In 2019, Ferrari shipped 10,131 cars and recorded net revenues of €3,766 
million. The main sources of revenue are divided in 4 business 
concentrations. In 2019, Cars and spare parts represented 78% of revenues, 
and grew 13.4% from 2018-2019. Engines represented 5%, and fell 30.3%, 
reflecting lower shipments to Maserati. Sponsorship, commercial and brand 
represented 14%, and grew 4.3%. Miscellaneous sources of revenue 
represented the remaining 3% and grew 6.4%. Overall, Ferrari’s revenues 
grew 8.3% from 2018 to 2019 at constant currency.   
 
The most complete and diversified portfolio of LPC 
Ferrari’s product offerings comprise four main pillars: the Sports range 
(SF90 Stradale, F8 Tributo, F8 Spider, 812 Superfast and 812 GTS), the GT 
range (Ferrari Roma, Ferrari Portofino, GTC4 Lusso and GTC4 Lusso T), 
Special Series (488 Pista and 488 Pista Spider), and Icona (Ferrari Monza 
SP1 and the Ferrari Monza SP2). Ferrari also produces limited edition 
hypercars, which main recent icon is LaFerrari Aperta. In 2019, Ferrari 
unveiled the SF90 Stradale, the first series production of Plug-in Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle (PHEV). Within this product range, Ferrari diversifies its 
product offerings by differentiating models in architectures, engine sizes, 
technologies, body styles, and seats.  
As part of its business plan 2018-2022, Ferrari aims to launch new models 
regularly, pushing demand while still producing in controlled levels by pillar 
and product. A total of 7 new cars were unveiled between 2019-2020, and 
12 models are expected to be unveiled between 2020E-2022E.  
 
Ferrari’s Strategies 
Ferrari’s brand diversification strategy is based on principles comprising a 
dual identity: exclusive, but also inclusive in relation to Formula 1 fan 
communities. The company will offer product categories that enhance the 
vibrancy and vitality of the brand, while complying with 3 pillars: “Brand 
Extension” pillar, a refined collection of products that will embody Ferrari’s 
Figure 6. Ferrari’s Store – Inclusiveness and 
Diversification with Luxury Industry 
 
Source: Company data.  
Figure 7. Ferrari – Revenues per Business Segment  
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Figure 8. Ferrari – Historical Stable Growth in 
Shipments  
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5 
DNA; “Entertainment” pillar, to reach out a wider and younger customer 
base, leveraging Ferrari’s racing roots; “Car Adjacencies” pillar, a 
collection of exclusive luxury products and services to complement Ferrari 
experience.  
Ferrari’s broader strategy focuses entirely on maintaining its leading position 
in the LPCI, in parallel with the enhancement and protection of the value and 
exclusivity associated with the brand. The company will focus on cost-
efficiencies and aim to achieve profitable growth by pursuing: Controlled 
growth – Having in mind that exclusivity is a direct function of rareness; 
Regular new model introductions and enhancements – The demand for 
Ferrari’s cars grows as a function of new releases, and 8 new models will be 
unveiled until 2022E, providing Ferrari with the strongest and most 
diversified portfolio of luxury performance cars in the company’s history; 
Pursue excellence in racing – Scuderia Ferrari and Formula 1 activities are 
an essential part of company’s brand maintenance; Controlled growth in 
adjacent luxury and lifestyle categories – which is part of augmenting 






















Ferrari’s business plan for 2018-2022 is based on four principles: 1. 
Meticulously constructed pipeline of product launches. 2. Enviable pricing 
power. 3. Appropriate investments. 4. Predictable and growing free cash 
flow. Other two goals are set as guides for Ferrari’s strategy to mature in 
2022: 1. Keep taking advantage of racing know-how and transferring it to 
road cars. 2. Deliver ~60% of total sold cars equipped with hybrid 
technology, decreasing CO2 emissions and complying with regulatory and 
market trends. 
 
Formula 1 and Scuderia Ferrari: A technology source enabling 
innovation 
Ferrari’s racing team, Scuderia Ferrari, is a core element in Ferrari’s 
marketing strategy, and also an important source of technological innovation 
for the engineering, development and production of the cars. Participating 
and succeeding in Formula 1 is a vitrine for Ferrari, with 1.922 billion total 
Figure 10. Ferrari – Geographic Segmentation 
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Figure 12. Ferrari – Evolution of Average Revenue 
from C&SP per Unit Delivered 
 














Figure 11. Ferrari’s 2019-2022 Business Plan 
 











Aiming to reach a 
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Collection of exclusive 
luxury products and 
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Ferrari experience
Maintain the leading position in luxury performance car industry
Enhancement and protection of the value and exclusivity associated with 
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Controlled growth => Focus on emerging markets
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Pursue excellence in racing => Scuderia Ferrari as a source of technology 
and brand strength
Figure 9. Ferrari – Revenues per Car Strategic 
Category 
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6 
global TV cumulative audience, according to the company. Visibility and 
success in Formula 1 activities enables Ferrari to benefit from sponsorship 
contracts, which allows the firm to promote and market its brand and apply 
racing technologies in commercial cars. The regulation in F1 pushes the 
participants towards innovating each year, bringing new or enhanced cars 
for the races. This is directly and indirectly applied as innovative features in 
Ferrari’s cars. 
 
Key-drivers of Revenue and Expenses 
For FY 2019, Ferrari’s net revenue is compound by three main sources: Cars 
and Spare Parts (77.7%, +15.4% over 2018), Sponsorship, commercial and 
brand (14.3%, +6.4% over 2018), and Engines (5.3%, -30.3% over 2018). 
The only source of revenue presenting negative growth is Engines, and it is 
expected, since the only customer is Maserati, and from 2022E the firm will 
switch-off Ferrari’s engines by in-house made. C&SP net revenues are 
composed of: (i) an increase in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan of 
20.3%, (ii) an increase in EMEA of 15.8%, (iii) an increase in the rest of 
APAC of 12.9%, partially offset by a decrease of 3.3% in Americas.  
On the expenses side, three main components are the main sources of costs 
to Ferrari in 2019, as percentages of net revenues: Cost of Sales (47.9%, 
+11.2 over 2018), Research and Development Costs (18.6%, +8.7% over 
2018), and Selling, General and Administrative Costs (9.1%, +4.8% over 
2018). Cost of sales consists of the cost of materials, components and labor. 
SG&A costs consist of costs for sales personnel, marketing and events, and 
retail stores. R&D are primarily related to Formula 1 activities to support 
innovation in luxury performance cars. In 2020E, SG&A tend to be higher 
related the revenue for the year, since part of them incurred even in the 
absence of production during the operations break. For instance, Ferrari fully 




An automobile, on average, has as components: 47% steel, 8% iron, 8% 
plastic, 7% aluminum, and 3% glass. In total, raw materials account for 47% 
of the costs for producing a vehicle. It shall be noticed that aluminum’s use 
is shifting against steel in LPCI, as part of a trend to decrease heaviness, 
enhancing performance without necessarily incurring in more pollution. 
Changes in the prices of these main components may impact the industry, 
pushing prices up or pulling profits down. Adverse behavior of commodities 
prices may affect the costs associated to producing LPC. However, the LPCI 
has been capable of transferring eventual changes in costs to the consumer.  
 
Management and Corporate Governance 
 
Major Shareholders 
Ferrari’s market cap was €30.5 bn thousand on December 2019, consisting 
of 193,923,499 common shares and 63,349,111 special voting shares, all 
with a nominal value of €0.01. At the same date, the company had 8,640,176 
common shares and 2,190 special voting shares held in treasure. These are 
partly due to repurchase (suspended) and equity incentive programs. Ferrari 
Figure 13. Ferrari – Key Drivers of Expenses as % of 
Net Revenues 
 
Source: Ferrari, elaborated by the student.  
57% 53% 51% 48% 47% 48%
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Figure 14. Ferrari and LPCI: Historical Production in 
Units 
 
Source: Ferrari.  
Note from Ferrari: Data for the Luxury Performance Car 
Industry include all two door GT and sports cars with 
power above 500hp, retail price above Euro 150,000 
(including VAT) sold by Aston Martin, Audi, Bentley, 
BMW, Ferrari, Ford, Hond/Acura, Lamborghini, McLaren, 











has a loyalty voting structure, aiming to reward the ownership of common 
shares and promote stability of Ferrari’s shareholder base by granting long-
term shareholders special voting rights. Special voting shares have only 
immaterial economic entitlements, not impacting earnings per share 
calculation, aiming to keep long-term governance and strategy stable.  
 
Exor is the largest shareholder of Ferrari, with approximately 24.0% 
shareholding interest and approximately 35.8% of voting power. Mr. Piero 
Ferrari holds approximately 10.2% of common shares and voting power of 
approximately 15.2%. The remaining shareholders, as February 2020, are 
BlackRock, Inc., owning 6.1% of common shares; T. Rowe Price Associates, 
Inc., with 4.7%. Public shareholders hold the remaining 55.0% of common 
shares.   
 
Corporate Governance 
Ferrari was incorporated as a public limited liability company under the laws 
of the Netherlands on September 4, 2015. The firm has adopted the best 
practice provisions of the Revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code 
(DCGC) issued by the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee. 
The DCGC contains principles and best practice provisions to regulate 
relations between the board of directors of a company and its committees 
and the relationship with the general meeting of shareholders. Overall, 
corporate governance structure seems suitable to successfully run Ferrari’s 
operations, with low likelihood of material errors in financial reports 
considering track records. By applying some of the best practices of the 
DCGC and cutting-edge frameworks to approach internal controls and risk 
management, Ferrari is improving its ESG scores year after year.  
 
The company has set programs to foster integrity of business conduct, 
including anti-bribery and anti-corruption items, part of Ferrari’s Code of 
Conduct. In 2019, there were no significant final judgments relating to the 
breach of (i) corruption laws, (ii) anti-competitive, antitrust and monopoly 
laws, (iii) environmental laws and (iv) social and economic area laws. During 
the year, the company faced no significant fines or other non-monetary 
sanctions, and no incidents of discrimination were identified.  
 
Corporate Management 
The Board of Directors is responsible for Ferrari’s strategy. Two executive 
Directors and eight non-executive Directors compose it, the lasts without 
day-to-day responsibilities within the company. Internal Committees are 
responsible for appointing the Board of Directors: (i) an Audit Committee, (ii) 
a Governance and Sustainability Committee, and (iii) a Compensation 
Committee. Seven of the Directors qualify as independent. Pursuant to 
Dutch law, Ferrari should secure its Board of Directors contain a minimum 
of 30% male and 30% female board members, with which Ferrari has been 
complying. Any resolution adopted must follow favorable vote of the majority 
of the Directors present or represented in the board meetings. 
John Elkann is the Chairman and Executive Director, and Louis C. Camilleri 
the CEO. Both and the remaining directors occupy their positions since 
2016, which indicates stability.  
Figure 15. Ferrari – Major Shareholders 
 




















Table 4. Ferrari's ESG Score 
 
2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 
 ESG Combined Score  B C+ B- C+ D+ 
 ESG Score (Weight 
100.0%) 
B C+ B- C+ D+ 
 Environment Pillar 
Score (Weight 34.1%) 
B- B- B B- D+ 
 Social Pillar Score 
(Weight 41.5%) 
B C+ C+ C+ D+ 
 Governance Pillar 
Score (Weight 24.4%) 
B+ C+ C C- C- 
 ESG Controversies 
Score  
A+ A+ A+ B- A+ 
Source: Reuters.  
 
Figure 16. Ferrari – Advances in gender equality  
 
Source: Company data. 
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Since its IPO in 2015, Ferrari has been improving all of the aspects 
compounding ESG score year after year. This testifies that since Ferrari 
became publicly traded, efforts to achieve the highest standards of 
Environment, Social and Governance have been promoted, and the results 
have been reflected in Ferrari’s rapidly improvement in ESG combined 
score, which tends to reach A in some years if the firm continues its efforts. 
In July 2020, Ferrari has been awarded the Equal Salary Certificate for 
providing the same salaries for men and women sharing the same 
qualifications and positions.  
 
Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning 
A dual identity firm: Car manufacturer in the luxury sector 
Despite being a car manufacturer, Ferrari is not comparable with its peers 
from the broader automotive industry. Aston Martin is the unique sharing 
characteristics comparable with Ferrari that is listed, and it is not the best fit, 
given its recent challenging situation4. On the other hand, Ferrari’s margins 
and multiples are more comparable with players in the general luxury 
industry, such Hermès and Pandora. Ferrari’s gross margin was 48% in 
2019FY, while on average 78% for the automotive industry and 35% for the 
luxury. Ferrari’s EBITDA margin of 34% is beyond 14% and 27% from auto 
and luxury industries, respectively.  
 
Competition in LPCI 
Ferrari market is specific: luxury performance cars as two-door cars powered 
by engines producing more than 500 hp and selling at a retail price in excess 
of €150,000 (including VAT). Only a few players produce these cars, almost 
all are part of major automotive groups. The industry is concentrated: Aston 
Martin, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Ferrari, Lamborghini, McLaren, Mercedes 
Benz, Porsche and Rolls-Royce are the main players. Competition is driven 
by the strength of the brand and features of the products in terms of 
performance, styling, novelty, innovation, as well as the producer’s ability to 
innovate in new product offerings, which stimulate the demand. For 
comparability and data availability, the comparison among Ferrari, Aston 
Martin, Bentley, Lamborghini and McLaren is performed.  
Ferrari has a strong track-record of stable growth in the quantity produced 
and revenues, which tends to evolve upwardly with less volatility than 
Bentley, McLaren and Lamborghini, and Aston Martin. Even if you consider 
the 2008 financial crisis and its impact in 2009 sales, Ferrari has proven to 
be more resilient then the competitors regarding the number of cars 
produced.  
Since 2005, Ferrari has presented the less volatile car output per year 
compared with its peers. Moreover, the quantity of cars produced by Ferrari 
is extremely correlated with the HNWI population, still with varying slopes, 
which does not hold for the peers. When it comes to revenues per quantity 
produced, Ferrari holds the Pole Position since 2012 until 2019, having an 





Figure 17. Ferrari and Peers: Historical Production in 
Units 
 








































































Figure 18. Ferrari and Peers: Revenues and HNWIs 
Population Growth (in bn for currencies) 
 
Source: Car Sales Base, company data, Capgemini, 
















second, McLaren, which is followed by Lamborghini, Bentley and Aston 
Martin, respectively.  
Differently of other segments in luxury markets, LPCI faces a significant 
portion of demand driven by new product launches. Consequently, the 
market share of individual producers fluctuates over time, reflecting 
launches. This tend to drive sales even when market conditions are not 
favorable, mainly because of the level of novelty, exclusivity and excitement 
a new product tends to create, capturing its own demand. Firms also hold 
the capacity of managing waiting lists to push or pull the demand. LPCIs’ 
players produce low volumes as part of their strategy to create scarcity, and 
from there derive exclusiveness. In this sense, market share is less 
important than new product launches.  
Ferrari held in 2019 23% of LPCI market share: 23% in top 22 markets, 23% 
in Europe, 19% in Americas, 29% in mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan and 30% in the remaining APAC. While competitors monitor market 
share as an indicator of brand appeal, the main players in LPCI do not focus 
on market share as a performance metric. Deliberately, the industry 
manages the supply relative to demand, defending and promoting brand 
exclusivity, which drives premium-pricing power. Producing high volumes 
may destroy the aura of exclusivity, on which scarcity is based. On average, 
Ferrari, Lamborghini, McLaren, Aston Martin and Bentley have 42% of their 
sales in EMEA, 31% in Americas and 27% in Asia in 2019. Asian markets, 
especially China, are considered the next frontier for LPCI to struggle for 
revenues and penetration.  
 
Macroeconomic conditions: Impacts on an exclusive market 
Sales of luxury goods tend to decline in recessionary periods, although the 
sales of LPC have proven to be resilient even in unfavorable times, 
especially for Ferrari. Currently, the COVID-19 (or “Coronavirus”) outbreak 
brings uncertainties that have been impacting end markets, supply chain and 
operations, and the effect may be adverse for the whole industry.  
After the recession of 2008-2009, the LPCI has been resilient to further 
economic downturns and stagnation in the broader economy, which was 
pulled by the increase of new product launches and the sustained period of 
wealth creation in many Asian countries, with expanding population of 
potential consumers of luxury goods. Even during the recession, Ferrari’s 
downturn in quantity produced was way lower than its peers’. Ferrari’s 
performance has proven to be resilient even in periods such as the financial 
crisis of 2008.  
 
The global economic prospect affects disposable income and impacts the 
consumer willingness to buy luxury goods. Coronavirus impact in asset 
prices may have strongly postponed purchase decisions of luxury 
consumers and LPCI in general; still Ferrari has been passing through this 
turbulence without great disruptions regarding pre-existent contracts, as well 
as sales have resumed, and no unusual volatility is occurring. It is expected 
that near-term global economic situation remains uncertain, and this will 
affect the wealth and willingness to LPC new purchases, and luxury good 
within the firm’s diversification strategy. 
Figure 19. Ferrari and Peers: The Geography of 
Competition (2019) 
 










Figure 20. Ferrari and Peers: Average Revenue Per 
Unit Sold 
 













 Ferrari  Lamborghini





COVID-19 Outbreak: Shedding Light on Uncertainty  
The expected impact of COVID-19 outbreak in Ferrari is now clearer, as the 
company reviewed some of the assumptions regarding goals for 2020FY. In 
2020Q1, when Asian markets were partially closed, Ferrari outperformed in 
relation to 2019Q1 figures. Shipments increased by 128 units, +4.9% vs. PY. 
Americas grew by +4.2%, EMEA +25.4%, Rest of APAC +23.2%, and 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan -88.7%, as a consequence of the 
deliberated anticipation of deliveries in 2019. However, in 2020H1, 
production ceased for more than two months, as well as stores, parks and 
Formula 1 activities, which is reflected in 2020E Income Statement. Even 
with the break, Ferrari expects to catch up this period since operations 
restarted on May 04, 2020, at least for cars and spare parts.  
Ferrari carefully controls its delivery agenda, and this allows the firm to delay 
or advance deliveries as needed. Moreover, four new models were unveiled 
in 2019, yet to hit the markets. As discussed, new or enhanced models are 
the engines of demand. According to Ferrari’s 2020Q2 presentation (non-
audited), the key impacts and expectations regarding COVID-19 were: 1. A 
significant reduction in Formula 1 revenues, reflecting lower number of races 
estimated in 2020 season, and retake without fans physically. 2. Brand 
activities project a substantial reduction, to reflect a slow recovery to pre-
pandemic levels. 3. SG&A and R&D expenses reflect prioritizations based 
on medium term impact analysis. 4. CAPEX projected for 2020 reduced to 
approximately €750 million. 5. Impact of COVID-19 to reflect primarily on 
2020Q2. 6. A potential second wave of infections was not considered as a 
scenario.  
Ferrari estimates that the stop in operations impacted the production and 
delivery of 2,000 units in 2020E, but reprioritization has provided the 
company with a catch opportunity of 500 units in 2020E. Moreover, after the 
first waves of coronavirus passed in Ferrari’s main markets, reassessment 
of waiting lists and new sales have been “strongest than ever”, according to 
Ferrari’s 2020Q2 non-audited results presentation.  
 
A Historical Perspective 
Ferrari’s shipments grew 9.5% (880 units) between 2018 and 2019, 
reflecting the strongest portfolio of cars ever held, set to be broader and 
more diversified until 2022E, with the conclusion of the business plan. Net 
revenues grew 10.1% YoY between 2018 and 2018, the same period, with 
shipments falling -3.3% to America YoY (deliberated waiting lists), and 
growing 15.8% in EMEA, 20.3% in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
and 12.9% in the rest of APAC.  
Breaking revenues by business segment, C&SP grew 13.5% between 2018-
2019, reflecting volume increase of the 488 Pista and 488 Pista Spider, the 
Ferrari Portofino, the 812 Superfast and the initial deliveries of the F8 
Tributo. New launches, as said, are the engine of demand in Ferrari’s 
market, and the firm is set to keep launching new models straightly until 
2022E. Personalization programs contributed to the growth in revenues, 
mainly related to Icona series, with Ferrari Monza SP1/SP2, the most 
expensive models available. Revenues from Engines decreased -30.3%, 
and are set to be even lower until 2022YE, when Ferrari will cease providing 
Figure 21. HNWIs Population Evolution Per 
Geography (in mn) 
 
Source: Capgemini.  
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Figure 22. Ferrari’s S90 Stradale, 1st Indtroduced 
Plug-in Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019 
 
Source: Ferrari.  
 
Figure 23. Lamborghini’s Sian, 1st Introduced Plug-in 
Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019  
 




Maserati with engines. SC&B revenues grew by +4.3%, reflecting higher 
revenues from Formula 1 racing activities. 
 
Margins and Financial Performance 
Ferrari’s margins are impressive compared with the car industry. Average 
gross profit margin was 52% between FY2017-2019, an increase comparing 
with the 2016 figure (49%). EBITDA margin in 2019FY was 33.7% and grew 
at a CAGR of 7.5% between 2016 and 2019. The firm achieved an EBIT of 
€ 0.92 bi, and EBIT margins has also been raising since 2016, achieving 
24.3% in 2019 and a CAGR of 8.31% between 2016-2019FY. There is no 
peer among car manufacturers with such EBIT margin (average for the 
industry is 7%). In luxury industry, only Hermes (34%), Moncler, (30%), 
Kering (30%), and Pandora (27%), presented EBIT margins comparable 
with Ferrari’s.  
ROE in 2019 was 47%, while ROIC was 25.5%. This last figure grew at a 
2% CAGR between 2016-2019, achieving its highest level (30%) in 2018. It 
should be referred that since 2018, Ferrari’s CAPEX is higher than historical 
figures due to investments in controlled expansion, which the firm seeks to 
achieve with a broader portfolio and selling more units from each car 
category. This cycle will start normalizing to historical figures in 2021E, and 
the new models deriving from this expansion only first reached markets in 
2019. Results in Net Revenues should start to be reflected in 2020E figures. 
Ferrari’s net profit margin was 19% in 2019 and grew at a 13% CAGR 
between 2016-2019. In 2018, net profit margin was 30%, the best mark in 
recent history. Ferrari’s operations may be compared with car manufacturers 
in terms of capital, but margins are comparable with luxury industry. Still, 
Ferrari presents figures outstanding even luxury peers.  
 
Temporary High CAPEX sustains controlled growth 
Ferrari’s CAPEX has been outstanding historical margins of around 11% 
over net revenues since 2018, when the current business plan started. For 
2020E, CAPEX is expected to match 19% of net revenues, in line with the 
figure in 2018-2019 (Ferrari’s 2020Q2 presentation confirms a CAPEX of 
around €750 mn). From 2021E on, CAPEX tends to normalize around 
historical figures. Ferrari has been resilient machine in generating CFO (17% 
CAGR between 2015-2019), achieving €1,3 bn on the last year, which was 
more than enough to cover the expansion CAPEX. 
 
 
Building the Future: Competition in LPCI and Shifting Towards Hybrid 
Players in LPCI are monitoring and contributing to the advance of 
autonomous driving technologies and how it will impact the automobile 
market. Autonomous driving technologies are an enhancing technological 
feature, bringing to cars sensors, artificial intelligence applications and drive 
assistant systems. A shift towards greener LPCs is not only a trend, but also 
a must. Models are already available, and in many jurisdictions, they are set 
to be the rule in some years. This challenges LPCI in applying electric 
technologies to decrease pollution, while being capable of delivering the 
same performance of combustion engines.  
The year of 2019 may be characterized by a turning point concerning 
releases of hybrid models by LPCI, yet models have been available since 
Figure 24. McLaren’s P1 GTR, 1st Introduced Plug-in 
Hybrid Model, Unveiled in 2019 
 
Source: McLaren.  
 
Figure 25. Aston Martin’s Valkyrie, hybrid model, 
unveiled in 2019 
 
Source: Aston Martin.  
 
Figure 26. Ferrari – Porter Five Forces Analysis 
 





















2015. Aston Martin5 confirmed the performance figures for its full hybrid 
powertrain and begun prototyping in 2019. Lamborghini’s concept car 
Asterion presents Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) technology, the same being 
applied by Ferrari. Applying the same technology and set to compete with 
Ferrari’s GT line, Bentley’s Bentayga Hybrid was also unveiled in 2019. 
McLaren is launching plug-in hybrids in 2020. Legislation is pushing the 
automotive industry towards more sustainable solutions, and this trend is 
only late impacting HPCI – players are now reshaping their portfolios and 
going greener. Overall, it may be expected that companies will be forced to 
speed up their moves towards new technologies to follow more restrictive 
regulations over pollution.  
 
The Geography of Competition  
Emerging markets are and will keep being the most promising source of 
potential growth. LPCI is already taking advantage of this reality, especially 
regarding Asian markets. In this sense, capabilities to operate in different 
cultural contexts, with different consumer expectations, values and behavior 
may be an asset for international expansion of sales. Ferrari is well 
positioned to catch up these opportunities, with a wide range of strategically 
located dealers that perform sales and render services. Emerging 
(highlighting Asia) economies are the expected source of future growth, and 
eventual additional and existing competitors are likely to aggressively defend 
their sales in these markets, as well as fighting for expanding in these 
geographies.  
 
Ultra and High Net Worth Individuals are the Main Consumers  
The uncertain macroeconomic landscape can negatively impact LPCI to the 
extent that it directly affects HNWI population, the main consumer in this 
exclusive market. According to Capgemini, the number of HNWIs grew at a 
CAGR of 7.1% between 2012-2018. Annual growth rate between 2018-2019 
was 8.8% globally, 6.1% for Africa, 2.7% for Latin America, 9.3% for the 
Middle East, 8.7% for Europe, 10.9% for North America and 7.6% for Asia-
Pacific. In 2019, the population of HNWIs was 19.6 million globally.  
 
Considering HNWIs as the whole potential market if Ferrari was a monopoly, 
the firm covered 0.052% of potential customers with units delivered in 2019. 
In this sense, it is fair to conclude that Ferrari’s strategy of controlled growth 
may be sustainable, even if broader market conditions are unfavorable. The 
cap would be the quantity the harms exclusivity, which may be well managed 
with the controlled demand and offer matching strategy. Despite the space 
available for Ferrari to grow, it is possible to see that some competitors, such 
as Maserati, have lost their luxury aura by expanding market-share (3/5 of 
Maserati’s models currently under €150,000, including VAT). Fiat Chrysler 
Group, which controls Maserati, recently released a turnaround plan for the 
firm, since getting closer to a premium automaker, instead of LPC 





Figure 28. Ferrari and Peers: SWOT - Weaknesses 
 


























Figure 27. Ferrari and peers: SWOT - Strengths 
 



























High loyalty level pushing launches as the engine of demand 
The main variable affecting the demand for LPCs is the launch of new or 
enhanced models. Producers may have more or less power to control the 
demand by managing the new releases agenda, and matching supply and 
demand according to the market conditions, aiming at scarcity and 
differentiation. Ferrari is especially capable of adjusting its production 
according to the market conditions or the firm’s needs.  
Loyalty tends to be high in the industry, and Ferrari’s case illustrates it: 
Approximately 41% of the customers are owners of more than one Ferrari. 
Moreover, Ferrari owners acquired more than 70% of the new cars sold in 
2019. Demand for LPCs may also be affected by factors directly impacting 
the cost of purchasing and operating the cars, such as the availability and 
cost of financing (which is important in the U.S. market), prices of raw 
materials, parts and components, fuel costs, government regulations 
(including tariffs), import regulation, taxes on luxury goods, etc.  
High residual value is important to the primary market. Clients, when 
purchasing LPCs, consider the expected resale value of the car, which is 
part of the overall cost of ownership. A higher residual value potentially 
lowers the cost for the owner to switch to a new model, which tends to 
reinforce client loyalty and the brand.  
 
Innovation Drives Differentiation and Exclusiveness  
Exclusiveness is highly connected with the innovation capabilities of players 
in LPCI, and investments in R&D are key to achieve it. For instance, Ferrari 
invested 18.6% of new revenues in R&D in 2019, 19.8% in 2018, and 19.2% 
in 2017. On its turn, Aston Martin invested 18.5% in 2018 and almost 26% 
in 2017. Innovation is also dedicated to applying greener technology to 
LPCs, yet the challenges to maintain the performance of combustion 
engines are to be surpassed. Some players in the industry take advantage 
of technology from their Formula 1 activities applied to the road cars, which 
is the case of Ferrari, Mercedes Benz, BMW and McLaren. Ferrari aims to 
have 60% of the models equipped with hybrid plug-in technology by 2022YE. 
Differentiation in Ferrari’s case may achieve unmeasurable levels, since 
each car may be customized in n different variables according to the 
customer’s preference, adding around 50% on the base-price for the model. 
Currently 3% of Ferrari’s production is customized, and this is expected to 
grow 4% YoY.  
 
Formula 1 is the main technology spillover source 
Ferrari depends on innovation to sustain itself as a business, and a symbiotic 
relation occurs between the innovation path followed by Scuderia Ferrari and 
Ferrari as a car manufacturer. The technologies applied to Formula 1 cars 
are often transferred and adapted to Ferrari’s road cars. Formula 1 also 
supports Ferrari’s strategy to go greener, as technologies applied to 
racecars are also evolving in that direction.  
Scuderia Ferrari is also the bridge that links Ferrari to the broader public, 
which will gain importance for the firm, since its diversification plans include 
new luxury good segments, such as home and personal appliances. This is 
the opportunity for Ferrari to achieve with its luxury aura a broader market, 
which grows at a CAGR of 4% according to Bain & Company. This 
Figure 29. Ferrari and peers: SWOT – Opportunities 
 


























Figure 30. Ferrari and peers: SWOT – Threats 
 
 























diversification step represents to Ferrari a chance of expanding its potential 
market to the limit it reinforces Ferrari’s exclusiveness. 
 
Flexibility in Production 
LPCI is composed by flexible production organizations, which allows the 
adjustment of production capacity to accommodate the expected production 
needs. Some players, such as Mercedes Benz, BMW and Audi may find it 
less challenging to reduce production of one of many car segments in which 
they compete. Others, such as Ferrari, Aston Martin and McLaren, may find 
it more challenging, yet they all seem prepared to operate according to their 
needs. In LPCI, being capable of adjusting production up or down may mean 
being able to manage exclusiveness.   
 
The Competitive Reality  
Applying Porter’s five forces to LPCI helps identify the main forces shaping 
the sector and positioning Ferrari amongst its few peers. Ferrari operates in 
a market compound of well-known brands of high-quality cars, and some 
players are part of larger automotive groups, such as Lamborghini, and may 
be stronger in the availability of financial resources and bargaining power 
with suppliers. What shapes competition is the strength of the brand and 
image, performance and design of cars, the reputation for quality and the 
driving experience offered to the customers.  
HLPI is also characterized by high growth, which is expected to remain 
strong. Competitive actions to increase market share may be expected by 
some players. However, products are highly differentiated. As the features 
of the cares are not the same, and personalization is a trend, it is difficult for 
a company to win customers from the others. Ferrari owner’s fidelity in 
buying new models illustrates it. This is also a sign of low bargain power of 
buyers, which select the brand and the model according to the higher value 
perception in performance, design or reputation.  
The threat of new entrants is low, and economies of scale and scope are 
difficult to be achieved due to the low volumes produced. High capital 
requirements also difficult the entrance of new players, which would face 
rigorous license and legal requirements to operate. A brief analysis on the 
average revenues per unit produced in the past seven years shows that 
Ferrari enjoys a leadership position among the peers. On average, revenues 
per car produced are 40% higher for Ferrari than for its second peer, 
McLaren. Ferrari outstands its peers in these features, which is reflected in 
the firm’s historical higher average premiums per unit.  
 
International Rivalry 
A high level of customer loyalty characterizes LPCI. In different levels, 
players are used to have clients owning more than one car of the same 
brand. A common challenge for the industry is being capable of achieving 
new customers, a very specific group of individuals spread around the world, 
yet countries such as China are considered the hotspots, sources of new 
buyers. Products are highly differentiated, and many times not even 
comparable. Players will find their niche and seek fidelity.  
 
Bargain Power of Suppliers and Buyers 




Source: cardesignaward.org.  
 
Figure 32. Ferrari is awarded in 2020 the Word’s 
Strongest Brand, second year in a row 
 
Source: Company data.  
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The industry is characterized by a narrow number of highly specialized 
suppliers with medium bargaining power, delivering high-quality inputs. 
Bargain power of buyers is low with high product differentiation: each car is 
considered unique, preventing customers to switch brands. Further, 
customization allows the customers to design their models in even more 
exclusive ways. HNWIs select the brand on which they have a higher value 
perception either in terms of performance, design or reputation.  
 
New Entrants and Substitutes 
The risk of new entrants in the industry may be considered low. Colossal 
initial investments, substantial amounts of capital to start operations and 
R&D, possible new entrants are car manufacturers that are not in luxury 
performance segment. The industry is highly regulated, which also favors 
companies already in car industry to transact to the HPLI. Yet, the sense of 
uniqueness associated with each vehicle creates a high level of customer 
loyalty, resulting in low threat of substitutes.  
 
SWOT Analysis 
SWOT analysis was performed to assess how well positioned Ferrari is to 
deal with the competitive reality that surrounds the firm, which is likely to 























Ferrari’s main strengths are related to the strong brand recognition, the 
innovation capacity, exclusivity and status associated with the brand, a very 
diverse portfolio of products, global presence and marketing capabilities. 
The main opportunities are related enter in SUV market with Ferrari 
Purosangue, competing for a category of cars in which Ferrari was not 
present until 2019. Controlled growth by expanding the models available and 
the volumes produced, and achieving new markets, mainly in China and 
Asia, will be key to sustain growth in the locations with expanding HNWIs, 
and also means an opportunity. Plug-in Hybrid technology covering 60% of 
Ferrari’s portfolio by 2022 is another opportunity to gain consumers worried 
with environment issues, but also a must to comply with regulations. A highly 
Figure 33. Ferrari – SWOT Analysis 
Strengths Brand recognition 
Innovation capabilities  
Diversified portfolio 






Electrification vs Performance 
Low volumes (limited economies of scale and scope) 
HNWIs widely spread 
High R&D and expansion CAPEX 
Formula 1 performance 
Opportunities New markets 
Electrification 
Focused market strategies 
Automatization 
New markets in luxury industry 
New segments in LPCI 
 
Threats 
Quality vs Expansion  
Expansion vs Exclusivity 
Compliance with environmental legislation 
Prospected macroeconomic conditions 
Prospect new generations of Ferrarists 




spread dealer and service provider network support Ferrari to expand the 
personalized cars, an opportunity to increase revenues per unit sold. The 
expanded-exclusivity Ferrari aims to achieve with another range of luxury 
products means a great opportunity to achieve the Formula 1 fan community 
and luxury consumers and products carrying Ferrari’s DNA. The main 
threats identified are compliance costs concerning emissions regulations, 
trade barriers and new tariffs on luxury products, production costs, political 
uncertainty, and the current phase of the economic cycle may negatively 




A BUY recommendation is issued for Ferrari, a valuation that is sustained 
by Ferrari’s resilience in crises period, on its capacity of achieving higher 
returns than peers and on controlled growth strategy, already initiated and 
likely to continue between 2021E-2022E.  
 
Strong portfolio and high premium prospects are the main drivers of 
cash flows 
Ferrari currently holds its most diversified portfolio of cars, which is expected 
to be amplified on the forecasted period, as the current business plan 
matures in 2022E. Ferrari’s capacity of controlling demand by carefully 
managing waiting-lists enhances the odds of predictable cash flows in the 
near future, and this may be levered by the controlled expansion plans. The 
sources of potential extra gains are 1. Hybridization (average premium of 
22%, 60% of cars delivered in 2022E), 2. Customizations: 19% CAGR 
between 2020E-2024E, when Ferrari is expected to deliver 760 customized 
vehicles, with average premium of 50% over the base price. New design 
centers strategically positioned. 3. Controlled growth and higher premiums 
compared with peers, position likely to be potentialized with new car 
categories, focusing on Icona and GT as levers of grow.  
Ferrari is shifting towards SUV and urban luxury performance cars, 
achieving customers valuing comfort over performance, which opens a 
completely new category of potential buyers within HNWIs. To achieve its 
expansion plans and sustain its operational capacity, Ferrari is expected to 
present abnormal CAPEX in the 2019-2021E period. We believe these 
investments will soon be translated into CFO, as new car launches and an 
enhanced portfolio is available between 2020E-2024E. Ferrari’s business 
plan 2018-2022 is strong, and even discounting the COVID-19 outbreak in 
Ferrari’s operations and units delivered, the management team has been 
showing strong capacity of matching demand and supply6, and interest in 
Ferrari’s cars is far beyond Ferrari’s willingness to sell, a point management 




Ferrari was valued with DCF (FCFF) method. To check the robustness of 





Table 5. Ferrari's Key Metrics and Multiples 
(Forecasted) 
Multiples 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
P/E 55.18 38.95 27.14 24.29 19.52 
P/EBIT 39.61 28.19 19.75 17.77 14.21 
EV/EBIT 45.93 32.69 22.91 20.61 16.47 
EV/Sales 9.8 8.18 6.68 6.05 5.41 
Key-
Metrics 
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
Revenue
s (€ bn) 
3.4 4.07 4.98 5.5 6.15 
EBIT (€ 
bn) 
0.72 1.02 1.45 1.61 2.02 
Net Profit 
Margin 
15% 18% 21% 21% 24% 
EPS (€) 2.77 3.93 5.64 6.25 7.84 





Figure 35. Ferrari – Revenue per business segment – 
actual and forecasted (in € bn and %) 
 
 
















Figure 34. Ferrari – Target Price Per Model and 
Upside Potential  
 




















(APV) and Economic Value Added (EVA), confirming FCFF valuation of 
€178 and €175, respectively. Despite the challenges in finding adequate 
peers to compare Ferrari in a multiples valuation, it was also performed, and 
Ferrari’s TP valued with the average P/E 2021E (source: Reuters) for luxury 
industry is €176, with an upside potential of 16%. Other multiples are not 
adequate to value Ferrari, considering automobile and luxury industry peers, 
and how specific Ferrari’s characteristics are. In this sense, our 
recommendation is based on the DCF model, confirmed by APV and EVA, 
and weakly confirmed by multiple valuation, since only one multiple matches 
DCF valuations.  
 
Risks to the price target 
A second wave of Covid-19 could impact Ferrari’s operations and delay 
further the deliveries, or even generating cancellations. If the firm is not 
capable of sustaining its leading position as a top luxury brand, premiums 
could harm CFOs, with lower prices per unit. Stricter regulation regarding 




According to the DCF approach, Ferrari’s TP for 2021YE is €177, which 
implies an upside potential of 16% over the closing price from July 30, 2020. 
A TP of €178.68 and €181 was obtained with APV and EVA models, 
respectively, supporting the DCF BUY recommendation. Relative Valuation 
with the multiple P/E 2021E (luxury peers) outputs a TP of €176.43, also 
supporting the other methods, despite the lack of perfectly comparable 
peers.  
A three-stage growth model was applied, considering the potential growth in 
units produced between 2021E-2022E (10% YoY), sustained by the Ferrari’s 
current strategy and expected new launches. Between 2023E-2024E, 
growth in production is forecasted as a period of stabilization, in which the 
current business plan matures, and sales tend to grow at historical rates 
(5%). According to our forecast, Ferrari will produce 13,235 units in 2024E, 
from 10,131 in 2019. From 2025E on, we assume constant growth rate for 
the perpetual period, considering Ferrari has still room to expand, but as the 
quantity increases, scarcity and premiums may decrease.  
 
Cars and Spare Parts will be the main driver of growth 
C&SP’s revenues will grow at an 14% CAGR between 2020E-2020E. 
Customized cars are forecasted to be 6% of units delivered, from 3% in 
2019, with an average premium of 50% over the base price. From 2022E 
on, 60% of the models will be hybrid, implying a 21% average premium 
(Appendix 7). Revenues from C&SP are forecasted to grow at a 14% CAGR, 
boosted by premiums from hybridization, customization and controlled 
expansion with new car categories.  
 
Engines, Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand (SC&B) faces challenges 
Despite the limited impact of Covid-19 in C&SP, Engines and SC&B are 
business segments highly impacted by the pandemics. Engines’ revenues 
present a -14% CAGR between 2020E-2020E, impacted by the end of a 
supply contract that Ferrari had with Maserati, which represented the 
majority of revenues in this line of business. SC&B, which include stores, 
Figure 36. Ferrari – Shipments (units), Revenues (€ 
mn) and EBIT (€ mn)  
 
 


















EBIT Net revenues Shipments
Figure 37. Ferrari – CAPEX and R&D (€ mn) 
 













CAPEX / Revenues R&D / Revenues
Figure 38. Ferrari – Cash Flows from Operating, 
Financing and Investing Activities, actual and 
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amusement parks, brand licensing, and luxury goods, is forecasted to fall 
50% in 2020E, and recover at a 6% CAGR between 2021E-2024E, in line 
with growth in luxury goods sales between 2012-2019. Only by 2024E 
revenues SC&B will be back to 2019 figures.   
 
CAPEX, D&A 
Ferrari has been investing in expansion since 2018, and the CAPEX is 
higher (19% of revenues until 2020E) compared with the average in prior 3 
years (11%). The firm stated that expansion cycle tends to normalize from 
2021E on, and achieve the average 11% after that, in the absence of future 
expansion plans. D&A rates are different according to the asset category, 
and few information is released about the exact rates of each asset. The 
average D&A of 9% in the last three years was applied.  
 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
A WACC of 6% was used to discount the FCFF between 2020E-2024E, 
according to the assumptions presented on the Table 5. Since Ferrari is 
listed in NYSE and in Italian Stock Exchange, and considering its current 
shareholder structure, Ferrari may be considered of the best interest of 
mainly Europeans and U.S. Investors. In this sense, risk-free rate, beta and 
the market risk premium considered both markets, weighted averaged by 
the volume traded in each market.  
 
The terminal growth rate (g) was estimated based on the forecasted long-
term GDP by OECD, weighted by the size of that market in Ferrari’s units 
delivered in 2019 (Appendix 07). Terminal Value accounts for 87% of the 
total Enterprise Value, and the model is highly sensitive to the variables 
WACC and g, which are stressed in a sensitivity analysis simulating different 
price per shares according to different assumptions for WACC and g. We 
also tested the impact of different growth assumptions in the final PPS, in 
both cases analyzing the DCF method.  
 
Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
For the APV method, the FCFF was discounted using the unlevered cost of 
equity, which by its turn was calculated using the unlevered beta. In parallel, 
the value created by debt was calculated by multiplying the tax rate by the 
interest expenses, and then discounted by the cost of debt.  
 
Economic Value Added 
EVA was estimated departing from the capital employed, from which we 
estimated the required return of investors applying Ferrari’s WACC (a simple 
multiplication). The required return was subtracted from the after-tax EBIT, 
outputting the EVA, which was discounted with the WACC.  
 
Relative Valuation 
Relative valuation was performed to check how reliable the DCF model is, 
since no fully comparable peers were identified. In this sense, the method is 
used as a proxy to compare the DCF’s model strength. Our hypothesis is 
that Ferrari’s operations, while comparable with other car assembling lines, 
are more comparable with a handcrafted good, such as a lapidated diamond, 
or a handcrafted bag. This implies Ferrari’s higher premiums and higher 
comparability with luxury peers, still far from perfect for valuation purposes. 








LVMH 29.09 15.65 21.14 
Hermes 49.23 25.39 30.01 
Salvatore 
Ferragamo 
65.22 9.29 31.62 
Brunello 
Cucinelli 
54.01 14.23 35.41 
Ferrari 44.98 31.86 32.69 
Average 48.50 19.28 30.17 




€176.43 €107.41 €147.61 







Both Ferrari and luxury players rely on exclusiveness and seek to maintain 
their price power, which is based on uniqueness. Still, relative valuation may 
not be considered a sound method for Ferrari’s case, given the firm’s 
peculiarities. The P/E 2021E is the only match for Ferrari’s DCF TP. 
Considering the remaining multiples, we may conclude Ferrari should be 
overvalued, which is not consistence with DCF approach.  
 




Risk-free rate 1.026% Risk-free rate was proxied with 1. Germany 10-Year Bond Yield - monthly historical Yields for 10Y to 
normalize (0.915%), since current yields are negative; 2. Despite the U.S. 10Y treasury yields (0.630%, Sept 
04, 2020), to maintain consistency, the same method applied to Germany was applied to the U.S. case, with 
respective weights 55% and 45%, derived from the volumes traded on NYSE and Italian Stock Exchange, 
respectively.  
Beta (raw) 0.76 As with risk-free, a beta of 0.75 was obtained by regressing Ferrari's stock returns traded in NYSE with the 
S&P500, proxy for the entire U.S. market. Ferrari's stock returns traded in Italian Stock Exchange was 
regressed against the EURO STOXX 600, and a beta of 0.78 obtained. Data was weekly for the last two 
years. Both betas were also weighted averaged (45% for the first and 55% for the second) by volumes traded 
on each stock exchange.  
Beta (Blume 
adjusted) 
0.84 Beta was adjusted with Blume approach.  




6.3441% Equity risk-premium was proxied with figures provided by Damodaran (updated in July 01, 2020). For the 
U.S. market, the equity risk premium is 5%, no country adjustment. For Western European markets, risk 
premium is 6%, and 1% of default spread was added. These figures were weighted averaged by the volumes 
traded.  
Unlevered cost of 
equity 
6.0548% Capital Asset Pricing Model, the unlevered cost of equity was computed as an input for the APV valuation 
method.  
Cost of equity  6.376% Capital Asset Pricing Model  
Cost of debt 1.62% Ferrari's debt is not rated, and the approach was to synthetically estimate it according to the rating that a 
company based on a developed economy would receive considering its interest coverage ratio. Ferrari's 
interest coverage ratio in 2019 was close to 20, and a ratio over 10 is enough for the company to be 
considered a Aaa/AAA, which spread is currently 0.63% (figure provided by Damodaran, July 2020), plus the 
risk-free rate. The average financial expenses were divided by average total debt between 2016-2019, and 
a cost of debt of 1.59%% obtained. Finally, we averaged both approaches to obtain the final cost of debt.  
Tax rate 24% Italian tax rate.  




Leverage Ratio D 
/ (D + E) 
8,763% Leverage Ratio for 2020YE, assumed to be constant, considering Market Capitalization on July 30, 2020, 







Table 9. Ferrari – DCF – FCFF Valuation (€ Thousand) 











Auto  31.14 14.52 14.89 2.32 
Luxury 48.50 19.28 30.17 5.92 
Ferrari 44.98 31.86 32.69 8.18 









Table 10. Ferrari – Adjusted Present Value Valuation (€ Thousand) 
 




   
Revenues Forecast Assumptions   
The quantity of cars produced was forecasted to grow 10% YoY between 
2021E-2022E, as the current business plan matures, and new models are 
launched (respectively four per year between 2020E-2022E). This trend also 
observed between 2018-2019, the first two years covered by the current 
business plan and is expected to be maintained until 2022E. Then, from 
2023E-2024E, Ferrari’s growth in units produced per year tends to normalize 
around 7% YoY, the level observed between 2013 and 2017, before the 
current business plan. In this second period, a 7% growth trend is justified 
by 1. Models launched until 2022E will still be hitting the markets; 2. 
Historically, Ferrari launched at least 2 new models per year, which could be 
expected to booster the portfolio after 2022E in the absence of information 
regarding Ferrari’s strategy after 2022. 
In 2020E, Ferrari was supposed to produce 11,144 cars, 10% more than the 
10,131 units produced in 2019. However, Ferrari’s operations were ceased 
between February and May 2020 due to the Covid-19 outbreak, which 
Valuation
Model: DCF - ENTERPRISE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (FCFF)
Growth rate (g) 2.124%
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E Terminal Value
EBIT 724,661 1,018,171 1,453,007 1,614,981 2,020,650
* (1 - T) 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760
(+) Depreciation & Amortization 319,965 338,823 410,646 468,443 536,023
(-) CAPEX -750,000 -462,600 -544,965 -642,185 -750,891
(+ / -) Changes in NWC -60,662 192,755 148,391 152,903 88,303
FCFF 60,045 842,788 1,118,357 1,206,547 1,409,129 37,854,487




Weighted average number of common shares for basic earnings per share186,767,000
Weighted average number of common shares for dilluted earnings187,535,000
Price per Share 177
Price per Share on July 31 2020 153
2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E Terminal Value
FCFF 60,045 842,788 1,118,357 1,206,547 1,409,129 36,728,226
Discounted unlevered FCFF 60,045 794,768 994,548 1,011,839 1,114,399 29,046,236
Total discounted unlevered FCFF 32,961,790
Value created By Debts 9,634 11,642 14,781 17,510 20,547 1,265,825
Discouted Value Created by Debts 9,634 11,456 14,313 16,684 19,266 1,186,865
Total discounted value created by debts 1,258,218
Value of Equity 33,447,912
Price per Share 178
Price per Share on July 31 2020 153
2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E Terminal Value
Capital 2,105,985 2,795,323 3,197,603 4,144,035 4,939,123 5,778,316
Levered Cost of Equity 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Required return (in Euros) 134,277 178,229 203,878 264,223 314,917 368,424
EBIT 917,446 724,661 1,018,171 1,453,007 1,614,981 2,020,650
EBIT * (1-T) 697,259 550,742 773,810 1,104,285 1,227,385 1,535,694
EVA + TV 562,982 372,513 569,932 840,063 912,468 1,167,270 30,705,139




Price per Share 175
Price per Share on July 31 2020 153
Figure 39. Ferrari – Production per strategic pillar – 
actual and forecasted, in thousands 
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impacted the firm’s capacity of delivering 2,000 cars in the year. After 
reprioritizing the operations plans, Ferrari estimates that will be capable of 
catching up 500 cars in 2020E, and so the Covid-19 outbreak impact in 
Ferrari’s production is of 1,500 units. In this sense, we forecast that Ferrari 
will produce in 2020E 9,644 cars, which represents -5.1% in relation to the 
quantity produced in 2019. According to our forecast, Ferrari will sell around 
13,225 cars by 2024E, an 8% CAGR over 2020E.  
Ferrari’s cars are divided in 4 strategic pillars: GT (average base price: 
€220,278), Sports (average base price: €347,546), Special Series (average 
base price: €311,200) and Icona (average base price: €1,500,000). GT cars 
represented 35% of the models sold in 2019, and are forecasted to 
progressively achieve 41%, since Ferrari aims to diversify and expand in the 
segment (Ferrari Purosangue is the first SUV model, and others are 
expected to be unveiled, achieving a customer valuing comfort and 
drivability over performance). Sports cars represented 60% of sales in 2019 
and are expected to reach 53% in 2024E, with a growth in units on the period 
but loss in percentual terms. Special Series are expected to remain constant 
as 4% of the models (sales in this category usually are related limited 
collection editions). Finally, Icona is the most expensive pillar, with the 
highest potential for premiums. The category represented less than 1% of 
sales in 2019 and is expected to achieve 5% by 2024E. Icona is the most 
promising source of potential gains from customization, regardless the fact 
that each car can be unique, it is unrelated with the category. From 2022E 
on, 60% of the cars will equipped with plug-in hybrid technology, which 
implies a price premium of 22% (see Appendix 7). Over the base price per 
strategic pillar, we have added a growth YoY of 2%, half of the average 
growth in revenues per car between 2013-2019. Also, personalized cars are 
expected to jump to 5% of total models sold in 2024E, achieving 760 cars 
compared with 376 in 2020E, implying an average premium of 50% over the 
model’s base price.  
Engines’ sales participation in total revenues have been decreasing due to 
lower shipments to Maserati, which has a contract with Ferrari for the supply 
of engines expiring in 2022E which is not expected to be renewed. Since 
2017, Maserati’s orders have been progressively decreasing. The item is 
expected to fall 50% in 2020E-2021E, with the end of the dealership. The 
remaining revenue is from the rent of engines to Formula 1, and we expect 
it to growth 3% YoY between 2022E-2024E, as observed between 2015 and 
2019.  
 
Finally, Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand, one important source for 
Ferrari’s diversification strategy in the broader luxury market, is expected to 
suffer a lot in 2020E due to the impact of Covid-19 outbreak in physical 
stores, amusement parks, and fan communities of Formula 1 not present on 
races. The item was forecasted to present a fall of -50% in 2020E, 
considering the results from the first half. From 2022E on, the item was 
forecasted to grow 6% YoY, in line with Ferrari’s historical figures and with 
the CAGR of similar luxury markets between 2012-2019 (Bain & Company).  
 
Net revenues are forecasted to grow at a 9% CAGR between 2020E-2024E, 
achieving €6,3 bi on the last year. For the same period, revenues from C&SP 
will grow at a 14% CAGR, from Engines to decrease a CAGR of -14%, 
reflecting lower shipments to Maserati. Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand 















Selling, general and administrative costs
Research and development costs
Net profit
Figure 40. Ferrari – EBITDA and Net Profit Margin – 
Actual and Forecasted (€ bn) 
 

























revenues will grow at a 6% CAGR between 2020E-2024E, shaping Ferrari’s 
strategy exploring new segmentations within luxury industry. Other revenues 
are to grow at a CAGR of 1% over the same period. 
 
As the Business Plan matures, the room for better margins is opened   
Gross Profit margin is forecasted to achieve 59% in 2024E from 52% in 
2020E, particularly driven by the effect of higher premiums per unit. With the 
end of the current expansion cycle, R&D expenses over revenues are also 
expected to gradually decrease from 20% in 2020E to 17% from 2023E-
2024E. After achieving historical figure of 30% in 2019, EBITDA margin is 
forecasted to fluctuate between 23%-34% 2020E-2023E, achieving 32% in 
2024E.  
EBIT margin is expected to grow at a CAGR of 6% between 2020E-2024E, 
achieving a level of 31% in 2024YE, as a result of premiums obtained with 
personalization and hybridization, stabilized R&D expenses and cost 
structure, and the end of higher CAPEX cycle. Finally, Net Profit Margin is 
set to grow at a 6% CAGR, from 18% in 2020E to 23% in 2024E. DuPont 
analysis shows a ROE varying between 46% in 2020E, slowly decreasing to 
21% in 2024E. ROIC is set to grow at a 1.23% CAGR, from 19% in 2020E 
to 21% in 2024E.  
CAPEX expansion cycle tends to normalize from 2021E-2024E, varying 
from 13% to 10% of net revenues in the period. For 2020E, CAPEX will be 
around 22% of sales, given the impact of Covid-19 in revenues and that the 
investments are maintained. FCFO is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 18% 
between 2020E-2024E, achieving € 2,1 bi by 2024YE.  
 
Sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation 
The DCF model is highly influenced by two variables: g and WACC. In order 
to test the behavior of the stock price according to changes on them, 
sensitivity analysis was performed, and the results are presented on Table 
12. Moreover, the Ferrari’s TP is highly dependent on the availability of 
FCFF. In this sense, we tested the impact of changes in the TP according to 
changes in FCFF and WACC. A Monte Carlo simulation was run with the 
intention of obtaining possible scenarios for the stock price, given changes 
in the variables g and WACC. Regarding the input data for the simulation, 
WACC’s average was considered the real WACC, with standard deviation 
of 1.49%; g average was considered the real g, with standard deviation of 
0.5%. The output of 50,000 simulations shows 69% of chance that Ferrari’s 
stock price will be with a price higher than October 07, 2020 close price.    
 
Table 12. Ferrari – Sensitivity Analysis with WACC and g 
                  Changes in Terminal 
Growth Rate (g) 






  1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 
4.2% 254 263 273 284 296 308 322 337 354 372 393 416 442 472 506 
4.4% 232 240 248 257 266 277 288 300 313 327 343 360 379 401 425 
4.7% 214 220 227 234 242 251 260 269 280 291 304 317 332 349 367 
4.9% 198 204 209 216 222 229 237 245 253 263 273 283 295 308 322 
Figure 42. Ferrari – Revenue, EBIT, Net Profit Margin 
& FCFF 
 














Revenues (€ bn) EBIT (€ bn)
FCFF (€ bn) Net Profit Margin (%)
Figure 43. Distribution of Prices for Different WACCs 
and Terminal Growth Rates – Monte Carlo Simulation 
 








5.2% 184 189 194 199 205 211 217 224 231 239 247 256 266 276 287 
5.4% 172 176 181 185 190 195 201 206 212 219 226 233 241 250 259 
5.7% 162 165 169 173 177 182 186 191 197 202 208 214 221 228 236 
5.9% 152 155 159 162 166 170 174 178 183 187 193 198 203 210 216 
6.2% 144 147 150 153 156 159 163 167 171 175 179 184 189 194 199 
6.4% 136 139 141 144 147 150 153 157 160 164 167 172 176 180 185 
6.7% 129 132 134 137 139 142 145 148 151 154 157 161 164 168 172 
6.9% 123 125 127 130 132 134 137 139 142 145 148 151 154 158 161 
7.2% 117 119 121 123 125 128 130 132 135 137 140 143 146 149 152 
7.4% 112 114 116 118 119 121 123 126 128 130 132 135 138 140 143 
7.7% 107 109 111 112 114 116 118 120 122 124 126 128 130 133 135 
 
Source: Elaborated by the student.  
 
Table 13. Sensitivity Analysis with Changes in WACC and in FCFF 










0.79 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.21 
4.2% 265 276 286 296 306 317 327 337 347 358 368 378 388 398 409 
4.4% 236 245 254 263 272 281 290 300 309 318 327 336 345 354 363 
4.7% 212 220 228 237 245 253 261 269 278 286 294 302 310 319 327 
4.9% 192 200 207 215 222 230 237 245 252 260 267 275 282 289 297 
5.2% 176 183 190 197 203 210 217 224 231 238 244 251 258 265 272 
5.4% 162 169 175 181 187 194 200 206 213 219 225 232 238 244 251 
5.7% 150 156 162 168 174 180 185 191 197 203 209 215 221 226 232 
5.9% 140 145 151 156 162 167 173 178 184 189 195 200 206 211 217 
6.2% 131 136 141 146 151 156 162 167 172 177 182 187 192 197 203 
6.4% 123 128 132 137 142 147 152 157 161 166 171 176 181 186 190 
6.7% 116 120 125 129 134 138 143 148 152 157 161 166 170 175 179 
6.9% 109 114 118 122 127 131 135 139 144 148 152 157 161 165 170 
7.2% 104 108 112 116 120 124 128 132 136 140 144 149 153 157 161 
7.4% 98 102 106 110 114 118 122 126 129 133 137 141 145 149 153 





Ferrari’s risks were divided into 4 types: 1. Market risk, 2. Strategic and 
Operational risks, 3. Regulatory and Legal risks, and 4. Financial Risks, and 
their probability / impact are plotted on the risk matrix.  
Market Risk | Deteriorating global economic conditions + Coronavirus 
may impact negatively profitability (MR1) 
Ferrari faces the risk of deteriorating general economic conditions affect 
disposable incomes and reduce consumer wealth, affecting demand and 
pressuring prices and volumes downward. Coronavirus toll has made 
governments impose control measures that affect end markets, supply 
Figure 44. Ferrari – Risk Matrix 
 
 






























chains and operations. The effect on Ferrari’s result may be material and 
adverse. The growth strategy in emerging markets may be adversely 
affected by macroeconomic developments in China and remaining Asian 
markets.  
Market Risk | Increasing competition may result in pricing pressures 
and reduced margins (MR2) 
Several global luxury automotive manufactures have increased competitive 
pressures for luxury cars, particularly in emerging markets. Ferrari 
anticipates that additional participants will enter the market, and existing 
market participants will aggressively seek to protect or increase market 
share.  
Operational Risk | Low volume strategy vs. current growth strategies 
(OR1) 
Ferrari’s limited number of models, and the strategy of maintaining car 
waiting lists, aims to reach the optimal combination of exclusivity and client 
service. On the other hand, Ferrari has been straightly increasing units 
delivered. If the firm is unable to balance brand exclusivity and higher still-
low volumes, it may erode the desirability, consumer demand and revenues.  
Operational Risk | Ferrari is incapable of innovating in high 
performance car technologies (OR2) 
Ferrari heavily invests in R&D, but if these activities are not capitalized as 
applied technology, Ferrari’s historic competitive positioning may be in harm. 
Costs related to developing and applying new technologies are high and 
may increase, and competition in LPCI does. Innovation capabilities include 
the leading design appeal.  
Operational Risk | Ferrari fails to maintain brand value (OR3) 
Ferrari may not succeed in preserving and enhancing the value of its brand, 
which could harm demand and revenues. The firm’s brand image partially 
depends on the success of Ferrari’s Formula 1 racing team. Changing in 
consumer’s preference towards greener technologies will force Ferrari’s shift 
to hybrid and electric engines. Ferrari’s long-term success in using hybrid 
and electric technologies, keeping performance, is uncertain.  
 
Operational Risk | Supply Chain & Human Capital (OR4) 
Ferrari depends on suppliers, many of which are single source suppliers. If 
these suppliers fail to delivery necessary raw materials, systems, 
components and parts, with the quality and timely expected, Ferrari’s 
operations may be disrupted. Human capital is highly specialized and also 
represents an operational risk for Ferrari.  
Regulatory and Legal Risk | Greenhouse gas/CO2/fuel economy 
legislation (RLR1) 
New or changes in current laws, regulations or policies from State 
organizations regarding increased fuel economy requirements, reduced 
greenhouse gas or pollutant emissions, or vehicle safety, may have a 
significant effect on Ferrari’s operational costs or business model.  
Regulatory and Legal Risk | Changes in tax, tariff or fiscal policies 
(RLR2) 
Any additional taxes and levies designed to limit the use of automobiles 
could adversely affect the demand, as well as changes in corporate and 
other taxation policies and export, incentives, import or tariff policies, could 
adversely affect Ferrari’s operations. The U.S. declared that it is considering 
imposing new tariffs on imported cars, decision still to be made. Brexit still 
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represents an uncertainty for Ferrari, and regulatory and legal issues may 
be expected.  
Financial Risks | Credit Risks: Ferrari’s indebtedness could adversely 
affect operations (FR1) 
Ferrari’s current and long-term debt requires a significant portion of the firm’s 
cash flows, which is used to service interest and principal payments. If 
interest rates rise, this amount may increase. Ferrari’s existing debt may limit 
its ability to raise further capital, additional debt, and execute its strategy. 
This risk could increase according to the increase in Ferrari’s leverage.  
Financial Risks | Financing sources, interest and exchange rates 
fluctuations (FR2) 
Ferrari is exposed to interest rate risk. If market rates for new car financing 
rises, it could push Ferrari’s consumers to less luxury options. If consumer 
interest rates rise, financial service providers tighten lending standards or 
restrict their lending to certain classes of credit, the clients may choose not 
to not be able to obtain financing. Ferrari also may be unable to provide 
adequate access to financing for dealers and clients, which may negatively 
affect revenues. Ferrari’s cash flows from sales may be denominated in 
other currencies different from the one used to production activities. So, 





Appendix 1: Statement of Financial Position 
For the years ended 
December 31, 
              
  2018 2019 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
      (€ thousand)         
Assets               
Goodwill 785,182 785,182 785,182 785,182 785,182 785,182 785,182 
Intangible assets 645,797 837,938 1,211,443 1,433,558 1,697,048 2,009,727 2,374,824 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
850,550 1,069,652 1,446,147 1,433,558 1,968,108 2,297,613 2,683,407 
Investments and other 
financial assets 
32,134 38,716 38,716 38,716 38,716 38,716 38,716 
Deferred tax assets 60,744 73,683 73,683 73,683 73,683 73,683 73,683 
Total non-current assets 2,374,407 2,805,171 3,555,171 3,764,696 4,562,737 5,204,921 5,955,812 
Inventories 391,064 420,051 362,763 453,629 486,756 517,266 517,738 
Trade receivables (net) 211,399 231,439 190,564 277,416 233,141 306,432 260,784 
Allowance for doubtful 
accounts (Trade 
receivables) 
24,346 27,171 27,924 28,698 29,493 30,311 31,151 
Receivables from 
financing activities (net) 
878,496 966,448 872,111 1,044,263 1,277,583 1,411,210 1,578,535 
Current tax receivables 128,234 21,078 74,656 74,656 74,656 74,656 74,656 
Other current assets 64,295 92,830 63,828 100,304 122,715 135,551 151,623 
Current financial assets 10,174 11,409 11,409 11,409 11,409 11,409 11,409 
Cash and cash 
equivalents 
793,664 897,946 288,970 766,001 1,971,622 3,007,464 4,413,544 
Total current operating 
assets 
1,673,488 1,731,846 1,563,921 1,950,269 2,194,851 2,445,114 2,583,336 
Total current financial 
assets 
803,838 909,355 300,379 777,410 1,983,031 3,018,873 4,424,953 
Total current assets 2,477,326 2,641,201 1,864,300 2,727,679 4,177,883 5,463,987 7,008,288 
Total assets 4,851,733 5,446,372 5,419,471 6,492,375 8,740,619 10,668,908 12,964,100 
                
Equity and liabilities               
Retained earnings 174,870 529,074 933,108 1,664,966 2,715,146 3,878,998 5,339,478 
Equity attributable to 
owners of the parent 
1,348,722 1,481,290 984,204 1,920,034 3,156,620 4,200,176 5,509,529 
Non-controlling interests 5,117 5,998 3,985 7,775 12,782 17,007 22,309 
Total equity 1,353,839 1,487,288 988,189 1,927,808 3,169,401 4,217,183 5,531,838 
Employee benefits 86,575 88,116 88,116 88,116 88,116 88,116 88,116 
Provisions 182,539 165,572 175,506 186,037 197,199 209,031 221,573 
Deferred tax liabilities  39,142 82,208 73,683 73,683 73,683 73,683 73,683 
Debt 1,927,167 2,089,737 2,667,788 2,596,950 3,496,248 4,267,563 5,185,640 
     from which               
        Non-current 1,190,493 1,180,438 2,388,679 1,912,299 3,447,421 3,941,960 5,277,813 
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        Current 736,674 909,299 371,282 776,824 141,000 417,776 0 
Other liabilities  589,743 800,015 793,680 831,716 873,200 918,471 967,901 
Other financial liabilities 11,342 14,791 14,791 14,791 14,791 14,791 14,791 
Trade payables 653,751 711,539 610,612 766,167 820,875 872,964 873,452 
Current tax payables 7,635 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 
Total current operating 
liabilities 
1,262,471 1,533,451 1,426,188 1,619,781 1,715,972 1,813,332 1,863,250 
Other non-current 
liabilities 
308,256 335,896 337,305 347,836 358,998 370,830 383,372 
Total liabilities 3,497,894 3,959,084 4,431,282 4,564,567 5,571,218 6,451,725 7,432,262 
Total equity and 
liabilities  
4,851,733 5,446,372 5,419,471 6,492,375 8,740,619 10,668,908 12,964,100 
 
Appendix 2: Income Statement 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT               
For the years ended 
December 31, 
                
  2017 2018 2019 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
        (€ 
thousand) 
        
Net revenues 3,416,890 3,420,321 3,766,705 3,395,461 4,069,989 4,979,344 5,500,154 6,152,296 
     Cars and spare parts 2,455,955 2,535,245 2,925,721 2,922,795 3,629,706 4,519,402 5,019,469 5,649,723 
     Engines 373,313 284,546 198,308 99,154 49,577 51,064 52,596 54,174 
     Sponsorship, commercial 
and brand 
494,082 505,701 538,328 269,164 285,314 302,433 320,579 339,813 
     Other 93,540 94,829 104,348 104,348 105,391 106,445 107,510 108,585 
Cost of sales 1,650,860 1,622,905 1,805,310 1,614,812 1,871,521 2,231,708 2,455,133 2,532,049 
Selling, general and 
administrative costs 
329,065 327,341 343,179 376,896 406,999 497,934 550,015 615,230 
Research and development 
costs 
657,119 643,038 699,211 679,092 773,298 796,695 880,025 984,367 
Other expenses, net 6,867 3,195 4,991 0 0 0 0 0 
Result from investments 2,437 2,665 3,522 0 0 0 0 0 
EBIT 775,416 826,507 917,446 724,661 1,018,171 1,453,007 1,614,981 2,020,650 
Net financial expenses 29,260 23,563 42,082 40,142 48,510 61,589 72,957 85,614 
Profit before taxes 746,156 802,944 875,364 684,519 969,661 1,391,417 1,542,024 1,935,035 
Income tax expense 208,760 16,317 176,656 164,285 232,719 333,940 370,086 464,408 
Net profit 537,396 786,627 698,708 520,234 736,942 1,057,477 1,171,938 1,470,627 
Net profit attributable to:                 
     Owners of the parent 535,393 784,678 695,818 518,083 733,894 1,053,103 1,167,091 1,464,544 
     Non-controlling interests 2,003 1,949 2,890 2,152 3,048 4,374 4,847 6,083 
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Basic earnings per common 
share (in €) 
            
2.83  
          4.16             
3.73  
              
2.79  
          
3.95  
          5.66               
6.27  
             
7.87  
Diluted earnings per common 
share (in €) 
                
2.82  
             4.14             
3.71  
               
2.77  
           
3.93  
            
5.64  
             
6.25  
             
7.84  
 
Appendix 3: Cash Flow Statement 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS           
For the years ended 
December 31, 
              
  2018 2019 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
      (€ 
thousand) 
      
Cash and cash equivalents at 
the beginning of the year 
647,706 793,664 897,946 288,970 766,001 1,971,622 3,007,464 
Cash flows from operating 
activities: 
              
     Profit before taxes 802,944 875,364 684,519 969,661 1,391,417 1,542,024 1,935,035 
     Amortization and 
depreciation 
288,748 351,946 319,965 338,823 410,646 468,443 536,023 
     Provisions accruals 15,573 14,253 12,887 18,760 15,766 20,723 17,636 
     Result from investments -2,665 -3,522 -3,522 -3,522 -3,522 -3,522 -3,522 
     Net finance costs 23,563 42,082 40,142 48,510 61,589 72,957 85,614 
     Other non-cash expenses, 
net 
33,012 38,563 38,563 38,563 38,563 38,563 38,563 
     Net gains on disposal of 
property, plant and 
equipment and intangible 
assets 
-283 424 -- -- -- -- -- 
     Change in inventories -4,638 -40,627 -57,288 90,867 33,127 30,510 473 
     Change in trade 
receivables 
26,890 -22,377 -40,875 86,852 -44,274 73,290 -45,647 
     Change in trade payables 40,317 53,940 -100,927 155,556 54,707 52,089 488 
     Change in receivables 
from financing activities 
-107,353 -76,694 -94,337 172,153 233,319 133,628 167,324 
     Change in other operating 
assets and liabilities 
-83,013 145,547 -6,335 38,037 41,484 45,271 49,430 
     Fixed income received  2,657 3,274 -- -- -- -- -- 
     Finance costs paid  -13,966 -42,600 -- -- -- -- -- 
     Income tax paid -87,745 -33,480 -164,285 -232,719 -333,940 -370,086 -464,408 
Total cash flows from 
operating activities 
934,041 1,306,093 628,506 1,721,540 1,898,883 2,103,888 2,317,009 
Cash flows used in investing 
activities:  
              
     Investments in property, 
plant and equipment 
-300,794 -352,154 -376,495 -240,486 -281,475 -329,505 -385,794 
     Investments in intangible 
assets 
-337,542 -353,458 -373,505 -222,115 -263,490 -312,679 -365,097 
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     Proceeds from the sale of 
property, plant and 
equipment and intangible 
assets 
1,392 4,539 -- -- -- -- -- 
     Proceeds from exercising 
the Delta Topco option 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
CAPEX -636,944 -701,073 -750,000 -462,600 -544,965 -642,185 -750,891 
Cash flow used in financing 
activities: 
              
     Proceeds from the 
issuance of bonds and notes 
-- 298,316 0 0 0 0 0 
     Repayment of bonds and 
notes 
-- -315,395 -371,282 -776,824 -141,000 -417,776 -149,891 
     Net change in bank 
borrowings 
-3,584 -3,516 0 0 0 0 0 
     Proceeds from 
securitizations, net of 
repayments 
94,709 92,173 0 0 0 0 0 
     Net change in lease 
liabilities 
-- -3,896 0 0 0 0 0 
     Net change in other debt -7,988 12,322 0 0 0 0 0 
     Dividends paid to owners 
of the parent 
-133,095 -192,664 -116,200 -5,085 -7,297 -8,086 -10,147 
     Cash distribution of 
reserves 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
     Share repurchases -100,093 -386,749 -- -- -- -- -- 
     Dividends paid to non-
controlling interest 
-2,040 -2,120 -- -- -- -- -- 
Total cash flows from 
financing activities 
-152,091 -501,529 -487,482 -781,909 -148,297 -425,862 -160,038 
     Translation exchange 
differences 
952 791 -- -- -- -- -- 
Total change in cash and 
cash equivalents 
145,958 104,282 -608,976 477,031 1,205,621 1,035,841 1,406,080 
Cash and cash equivalents at 
the end of year 
793,664 897,946 288,970 766,001 1,971,622 3,007,464 4,413,544 
Appendix 4: Key Financial Ratios 
KEY FINANCIAL 
RATIONS (RACE) 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
PROFITABILITY RATIOS 
       
Gross Profit Margin 49% 52% 53% 52% 52% 54% 55% 55% 59% 
EBITDA Margin 21% 21% 26% 30% 34% 31% 23% 27% 32% 
EBIT Margin 19% 23% 24% 24% 21% 25% 29% 29% 33% 
Net Profit Margin 13% 16% 23% 19% 15% 18% 21% 21% 24% 
ROA 3% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 
ROE 121% 69% 58% 47% 53% 38% 33% 28% 27% 
ROIC (Damodaran) 22% 24% 29% 33% 19% 23% 26% 24% 25% 
EFFICIENCY RATIOS 
        
Trade Receivables 
Turnover 





27.1 36.5 34.8 24.0 25.6 23.5 20.8 19.9 18.6 
Financial Receivables 
Turnover 
-39% -8% 18% 10% -10% 18% 20% 10% 11% 
Inventory Turnover 10 10 9 9 9 10 11 11 12 
Days Inventory 
Outstanding (DIO) 
72 79 88 82 88 80 77 75 75 
Days Payable 
Outstanding (DPO) 
129 135 142 138 149 134 130 126 126 
Accounts Receivable 
Period 
27 37 35 24 26 24 21 20 19 
Inventory Period 36 38 42 39 42 37 34 33 31 
Operating Cycle 64 75 77 63 68 60 55 53 49 
Cash Cycle 
Conversion (CCC) 
-31 -19 -19 -32 -35 -31 -32 -31 -33 
Fixed Asset Turnover  4.79 4.95 4.38 3.92 2.70 2.83 2.93 2.58 2.47 
Total Asset Turnover 0.80 0.86 0.76 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.65 0.57 0.52 
LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
        
Current Ratio 1.31 1.65 1.96 1.72 1.31 1.68 2.43 3.01 3.76 
Quick Ratio 0.44 0.72 0.95 0.73 0.37 0.60 1.32 1.79 2.54 
Cash Ratio 0.32 0.51 0.63 0.59 0.20 0.47 1.15 1.66 2.37 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE  
        
Total Debt to Total 
Equity  
5.60 2.43 1.42 1.41 2.70 1.35 1.10 1.01 0.94 
Total Debt to Total 
Assets 
0.48 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Debt to EBITDA 2.19 1.84 1.73 1.65 2.55 1.91 1.88 2.05 2.03 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
-17.18 20.67 31.08 19.96 20.50 18.28 17.30 18.67 19.81 
Long-Term Debt to 
Equity 
3.61 1.52 0.88 0.79 2.42 0.99 1.09 0.93 0.95 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 
0.48 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
OTHER RATIOS 
        
CAPEX over Sales 11% 11% 19% 19% 22% 11% 11% 12% 12% 
 
Appendix 5: Common-Size Statement of Financial Position 
COMMON-SIZE STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION           
For the years ended December 31,               
  2018 2019 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
      (€ thousand)       
Assets               
Goodwill 16% 14% 14% 12% 9% 7% 6% 
Intangible assets 13% 15% 22% 22% 19% 19% 18% 
Property, plant and equipment 18% 20% 27% 22% 23% 22% 21% 
Investments and other financial assets 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Deferred tax assets 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Total non-current assets 49% 52% 66% 58% 52% 49% 46% 
Inventories 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
Trade receivables 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
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Receivables from financing activities  18% 18% 16% 16% 15% 13% 12% 
Current tax receivables 3% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Other current assets 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Current financial assets 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Cash and cash equivalents 16% 16% 5% 12% 23% 28% 34% 
Total current assets 51% 48% 34% 42% 48% 51% 54% 
Total assets 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                
Equity and liabilities               
Equity attributable to owners of the parent 28% 27% 18% 30% 36% 39% 42% 
Non-controlling interests 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total equity 28% 27% 18% 30% 36% 40% 43% 
Employee benefits 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Provisions 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Deferred tax liabilities  1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Debt 40% 38% 49% 40% 40% 40% 40% 
Other liabilities  12% 15% 15% 13% 10% 9% 7% 
Other financial liabilities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade payables 13% 13% 11% 12% 9% 8% 7% 
Current tax payables 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total liabilities 72% 73% 82% 70% 64% 60% 57% 
Total equity and liabilities  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Appendix 6: Common-Size Income Statement 
COMMON-SIZE CONSOLIDATED INCOME 
STATEMENT 
            
For the years ended December 
31, 
 
              
  2017 2018 2019 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
        %         
Net revenues 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Cost of sales 48% 47% 48% 48% 46% 45% 45% 41% 
Selling, general and 
administrative costs 
10% 10% 9% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Research and development 
costs 
19% 19% 19% 20% 19% 16% 16% 16% 
Other expenses, net 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Result from investments 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
EBIT 23% 24% 24% 21% 25% 29% 29% 33% 
Net financial expenses 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
Profit before taxes 22% 23% 23% 20% 24% 28% 28% 31% 
Income tax expense 6% 0% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8% 
Net profit 16% 23% 19% 15% 18% 21% 21% 24% 
Net profit attributable to:                 
     Owners of the parent 16% 23% 18% 14% 19% 28% 31% 39% 
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     Non-controlling interests 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Basic earnings per common 
share (in €) 
2.83 4.16 3.73 2.79 3.95 5.66 6.27 7.87 
Diluted earnings per common 
share (in €) 
2.82 4.14 3.71 2.77 3.93 5.64 6.25 7.84 
 
Appendix 7: Forecasting Assumptions 
Assets 
        
Goodwill 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Intangible assets Each intangible asset class was assumed to grow at 18% YoY, according to the growth between 2017-
2019, with a higher stated CAPEX for 2020E aiming at expansion and capped at 750,000 (€ thousand) 
in 2020E, with is 46% higher than the 18% average growth.  
Property, plant and equipment Each PP&E asset class was forecasted according to its average grow YoY between 2017-2017. PP&E 
in total is assumed to grow at 18% YoY. A higher stated CAPEX for 2020E aiming at expansion and 
capped at 750,000 (€ thousand) in 2020E, with is 46% higher than the 18% average growth.  
Investments and other financial 
assets 
2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Deferred tax assets 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Inventories Forecast Derived from Inventory Days ratio. 
Trade receivables (net) Forecast Derived from Accounts Receivable Days ratio.  
Allowance for doubtful accounts Forecasted to be constant at 3% of Trade Receivables.  
Receivables from financing 
activities  
Forecasted to be constant at 26% of Net Revenues, in line with the average in the past 3 years.  
Current tax receivables 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Other current assets Forecasted to be constant at 2% of Net Revenues, in line with the average in the past 3 years.  
Current financial assets 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Employee benefits 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Provisions Forecasted to be constant at 6% of Net Revenues for Cars & Spare Parts, in line with the average in the 
past 3 years.  
Deferred tax liabilities  2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Debt Forecasted to be constant at 40% of Total Assets.  
Other liabilities  Forecasted under different assumptions, depending on the item.  
Other financial liabilities 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Trade payables Forecast derived from Trade Payable Days ratio.  
Current tax payables 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
Revenue Assumptions*** 
        
     Cars and spare parts A bottom-up approach was used to forecast the quantity of cars to be produced each year from 2020E-
2024E. We also considered the average base price for each class of cars (GT, Sports & Special Series, 
and Icona), que the weights Ferrari aims to produce for each class. With that, other assumptions were 
used, explained in Appendix. C&SP are forecasted to growth in three different stages: 1. 2020 and the 
impact of COVID-19 in 1,500 units, and a decrease of -5% units delivered in 2020E; without the COVID-
19 impact, the number of units delivered was forecasted to grow 10% in the year, and the trend is 
maintained for the second stage. 2. 2021E-2022E, 10% YoY, in line with the Business Plan 2018-2022, 
which impact will bring revenues from a mix of more units sold, hybridization and customization 
premiums, and a natural historical increase in Net Revenues per Ferrari sold. COVID-19 impacted 
Ferrari's operations, but did not have material impact in waiting lists. 3. 2023E-2024E, 7% YoY. In this 
period, Ferrari will be harvesting from the widest ever range of vehicles to be launched until 2022E, but 
considering hybridization and customization premiums, and a halved average natural historical increase 
in Net Revenues per Ferrari sold.  
     Engines Engines Revenues are set to decrease -50% in 2020E-2021E due to the end of Maserati contract and 
deliveries. The item is expected to growth 3% YoY from 2022E-2024E.  
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     Sponsorship, commercial and 
brand 
Sponsorship, commercial and brand activities Revenues will suffer a fall of -50% in 2020E due to the 
Covid-19 outbreak impact on activities and operations. From 2021E-2024E, the item is forecasted to 
grow 6% YoY, in line with 3 years average and the luxury industry CAGR between 2012-2019.  
     Other Other revenues forecasted to growth 1% YoY, in line with 3 years average.  
Cost of sales Cost of Sales forecasted to be constant at 48% of Net Revenues, excluding revenues forecasted as the 
growth in premiums per car sold, which was 2% between 2021E-2022E, half of the observed between 
2012-2019 to be more conservative. For not impacting operations, this premium is not computed as part 
of Cost of Sales, despite being part of Net Revenues.  
Selling, general and administrative 
costs 
Forecasted to be constant at 10% of Net Revenues. In 2020E, due to the Covid-19 impact on Ferrari’s 
operations, the item will correspond to 11% of Net Revenues. 
Research and development costs 2020E: 20% of net Revenues (higher CAPEX for controlled expansion). 2021E-2022E: 19% (normalizing 
to the average, end of the business plan in 2022E). 2023E-2024E: 16%, 3-year average (2014-2017), 
before the Ferrari's Business Plan 2018-2022.  
Income tax expense Forecasted to be constant at 24%.  
     Amortization and depreciation Average Amortization and Depreciation is 9%.  
     Provisions accruals Forecasted with three years average over Trade Receivables, 7%. 
     Result from investments 2019YE figure maintained constant.  
     Dividends paid to owners of the 
parent 
Constant at 0.69%. 
 
*** More details about Forecasting Revenue: 
HNWIs population has been growing, as so as their wealth, and Ferrari’s penetration in this community is still low, 0.005% in 2019, varying on 
Ferrari’s history but never higher than 2019’s figure. This represents potential for the expansion plans even if HNWIs popula tion does not grow at 
all between 2020E-2024E. High levels of customer fidelity also means that Ferrari’s owners are expected to own the majority of the new models 
sold in the coming years, which makes the real Ferrari’s coverage rate of HNWIs even lower. Besides that, the waiting lists and new sales are 
robust according to the results non-audit presentation of 2020Q2. In this sense, the Covid-19 outbreak impacted Ferrari’s revenues from C&SP 
due to less units delivered in 2020E, and not due to a reverse on prior trends.  
The percentages of line-up strategic pillars (GT, Sports Cars & Special Series, and Icona) vary from 2021E-2024, starting respectively on 30%, 
65% and 5% in 2021E, to 50%, 45% and 5% in 2024E, in line with Ferrari’s strategy of competing for performance luxury comfort urban cars. The 
average base price in April of 2020 for each model in GT, Sports & Special Series, and Icona, was considered in the forecast.  
Ferrari has presented an average incremental revenue per car of 4% YoY between 2014-2019. This represents the resilience and historical 
capacity of increasing premiums per unit. To be conservative, these premiums were at historical levels of 4% in 2020E, and three years moving 
average from 2021E-2024E, which outputs an average price premium of 2% YoY per unit sold, and since premiums may not be achieved on the 
longer-term.  
Another source of higher premiums per unit is customization. In 2018, around 3% of total units delivered were personalized. This figure is expected 
to growth 4% YoY between 2020E-2024E, and the average personalization premiums is 50% the initial value of the model. To support this growth, 
Ferrari is investing personalization labs in some of its main geographies. In 2019, the firm opened its third design lab in New York, a tailor-made 
center of 6,600-square-foot showroom in Manhattan.  
Ferrari’s business plan expects that 60% of all models available in 2022E will be equipped with Hybrid Plug-in technology. In 2019, the first model 
was unveiled. A proxy for Hybrid Plug-in premiums was estimated with 13 models from Hyunday, Porsche, BMW, Volvo and Peugeot, and found 
an average of 17% price premium for this model. Considering Ferrari’s past record and capacity of delivering results, this premium rate was also 
applied to Ferrari. Since 60% of models will contain this technology in 2022E, an assumption of 30% technology coverage in 2021E portfolio was 
made, considering the 6 models expected to be unveiled between 2020E-2021E.  
Ferrari’s Shipments CAGR and Terminal Growth Rate 
Ferrari's unit shipments by 
geographic market:  
     
For the years ended on 
December 31,  
0 1 2 
  
# of cars 2017 2018 2019 CAGR OECD Long Term Forecasted Growth 
EMEA 
     
   UK 843.00 981.00 1,120.00 0.15 0.02 
   GERMANY 710.00 803.00 967.00 0.17 0.01 
   ITALY 417.00 479.00 559.00 0.16 0.01 
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   SWITZERLAND 339.00 380.00 454.00 0.16 0.02 
   FRANCE 346.00 399.00 452.00 0.14 0.02 
   MIDDLE EAST 331.00 326.00 309.00 -0.03 0.03 
   OTHER EMEA 751.00 859.00 1,034.00 0.17 0.03 
TOTAL EMEA 3,737.00 4,227.00 4,895.00 0.14 
 
AMERICAS 2,811.00 3,000.00 2,900.00 0.02 0.02 
MAINLAND CHINA, HONG 
KONG AND TAIWAN 
617.00 695.00 836.00 0.16 0.02 
REST OF APAC 1,233.00 1,329.00 1,500.00 0.10 0.03 
TOTAL 8,398.00 9,251.00 10,131.00 0.10 0.0212379 
 
Ferrari’s Strategic Car Categories 
Ferrari's Line-Up Strategic Pillars - % participation in total cars produced 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E Assumption 
Sports  0.59 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 Sports cars participation in total units produced 
tends to fall in the forecasted period, in line with 
Ferrari's diversification within GT range and 
Icona. Sports cars participation in total units 
produced is set to decrease at a 3% CAGR, in 
line with the movement happening between 
2017-2019.  
GT 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 GT cars participation in total units produced 
tends to grow at a 2.4% CAGR between 2020E-
2024E, in line with Ferrari's investments to be 
more competitive in GT car range, with an 
enlarged option of super and elegant GT cars. 
The CAGR is also in line with GT CAGR in 
Ferrari's unit produced between 2016-2019. 
Ferrari Roma was unveiled in 2019, and is 
expected to hit the markets in 2020E, as the 
four-five new GT models that may enhance 
Ferrari's portfolio until 2022E.  
Special 
Series 
0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 Special Series cars were forecasted to remain 
stable between 2020E-2024E, since Ferarri 
tends to put more efforts in expanding GT and 
Icona Series.  
Icona 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 Icona line was introduced in 2019, and has 
proven to be a success, yet sales are still to hit 
markets. Two models are currently available, 
and the segment represents the highest 
potential premium to Ferrari, with highly 
personalized limited models. The company 
aims Icona to reach 5% of units sold by 2024E. 
There are on average 2 Icona models available 
each year, which means around 300 of each 
model available sold per year in 2024E, a highly 
exclusive masterpiece.  
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Source: Estimated by the student with company information.  
Ferrari’s Number of Cars by Strategic Pillar 
Ferrari's Line-Up Strategic Pillars - # of cars produced per Strategic Pillar 
  
 
2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
Sports  5921 6079 5423 5778 6156 6404 6663 
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GT 2960 3586 3395 3819 4295 4717 5181 
Special Series 370 405 378 416 456 490 525 
Icona 0 61 170 275 392 508 630 
Source: Estimated by the student with company information.  
 
Ferrari’s Average Price per Car and Average Price per Strategic Pillar 
Category Model Base Price (2019 - ex-
VAT and dealer's 
margins) 
Average Price by 
Category 
GT Car Ferrari Portofino  €       198,061.00  220,277.75 
GT Car Ferrari Roma  €       210,000.00  
 
GT Car Ferrari GTC4Lusso  €       236,525.00  
 
GT Car Ferrari GTC4Lusso T  €       236,525.00  
 
Sport Car Ferrari F8 Tributo  €       236,000.00  347,545.40 
Sport Car Ferrari 812 Superfast  €       303,727.00  
 
Sport Car Ferrari 812 GTS  €       336,000.00  
 
Sport Car Ferrari FS90 Stradale  €       600,000.00  
 
Sport Car Ferrari F8 Spider  €       262,000.00  
 
Special Series Car Ferrari 488 Pista  €       296,000.00  311,200.00 
Special Series Car Ferrari 488 Pista Spider  €       326,400.00  
 
Icona Ferrari Monza SP1/SP2  €    1,500,000.00  1,500,000.00 
Source: Estimated by the student with company information.  
 
The following weights were multiplied by the average price per car according to each category. From 2022E on, 60% of C&SP bring Hybrid 
Premium, and 5% of the cars sold will be customized, which implies an average premium per customized car of 50%.  



























price of a Ferrari 






(60% of total 
cars delivered 
from 2022 on 
are expected 
to be Hybrid 
models) 
GT Cars 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40  € 320,807.07   € 168,426.20   € 65,990.04  
Sports Car 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 
   
Special Series 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
   
Icona 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
   
Source: Estimated by the student with company information.  
 
The following table shows the proxies applied to calculate Ferrari’s average hybrid premium: 
Estimated price premium for hybrid models 






Hyundai 2018 Hybrid Hyundai Sonata 22,050.00   26,000.00  18% 
Porsche Panamera 4 / Panamera 4S E-Hybrid 125,973.00 138,589.00 10% 
 
Panamera 4 Executive / Panamera 4S E-hybrid 
Executive  
139,064.00 152,857.00 10% 




Mercedes-Benz E 300 e E 200 Limousine 60,549.00  67,650.00  12% 
Hyundai Ioniq Hev / Ioniq EV 27,906.00 36,580.00 31% 
Volvo XC60 Momentum Diesel / Hybrid 56,399.00 65,377.00 16% 
 
S90 Momenum / S90 R-Design 58,063.00 70,229.00 21% 
Peugeot Allure / Allure HY  33,980.00 44,505.00 31% 
 
GT Line / GT Line HY 36,980.00 47,305.00 28% 
Average 
   
21% 
Source: Estimated by the student with company information.  
 
Appendix 8: WACC and Summary of Valuation Models 




Applying Beta's formula:  
 
Covariance Ferrari (Italian Stock Exchange) - EURO STOXX 600 0.00069 
Variance EURO STOXX 600 0.00096 
Ferrari's European Beta 0.71965 
Covariance Ferrari (NYSE) - S&P 500 0.00066 
Variance S&P 500 0.00112 
Ferrari's U.S. Beta 0.58403 
Weight* U.S Beta  0.45044 
Weight* European Beta 0.54956 
Ferrari's Beta  0.65856 
Applying linear regression:  
 
Ferrari's U.S. Beta  0.74900 
Ferrari's European Beta 0.77800 
Ferrari's Beta (linear regression) 0.76494 
Average Beta (formula, linear regression and bottom-up beta) 0.71175 
Source: Reuters and company information, elaborated by the student.  
Ferrari's Beta Estimated by Reuters 
(access on October 06, 2020) 
90 Days (daily) 0.65 
180 Days (daily) 0.73 
2 Years (monthly) 0.56 
3 Years (monthly) 0.66 
5 Years (monthly) 0.54 
Source: Reuters. 
Beta obtained with Regression:  
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Summary statistics: Ferrari vs S&P 500 returns 
       
         
Regression of variable Ferrari's Returns (New York Stock Exchange): 
   
         
Goodness of fit statistics (Ferrari's Returns (New York Stock Exchange)): 
   
         
Observations 104 
       
Sum of weights 104 
       
DF 102 
       
R² 0.393 
       
Adjusted R² 0.387 
       
MSE 0.001 
       
RMSE 0.031 
       
MAPE 85.155 
       
DW 2.330 
       
Cp 2.000 
       
AIC -718.171 
       
SBC -712.882 
       
PC 0.631 
       
         
Model parameters (Ferrari's Returns (New York Stock Exchange)): 
   
         
Source Value Standard 
error 







Intercept 0.003 0.003 0.866 0.389 -0.003 0.009 
  
S&P 500 returns 0.749 0.092 8.124 <0.0001 0.566 0.931 
  
                  
Equation of the model (Ferrari's Returns (New York Stock Exchange)): 
   
         
Ferrari's Returns (New York Stock Exchange) = 0.00267218683299144+0.748685707641582*S&P 500 returns 
         
         
 
Summary statistics: Ferrari vs EURO STOXX 600 returns 
      







Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
deviation 
Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - 
Borsa Italiana) 
104 0 104 -0.130 0.130 0.004 0.038 
EURO STOXX 600 returns 104 0 104 -0.180 0.070 0.000 0.030 
Correlation matrix: 
      




Goodness of fit statistics (Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - Borsa Italiana)): 
 
Observations 104 
      
Sum of weights 104 
      
DF 102 
      
R² 0.398 
      
Adjusted R² 0.393 
      
MSE 0.001 
      
RMSE 0.029 
      
MAPE 73.833 
      
DW 2.075 
      
Cp 2.000 
      
AIC -732.752 
      
SBC -727.463 
      
PC 0.625 
      
        
Analysis of variance (Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - Borsa Italiana)): 
 




F Pr > F 
  
Model 1 0.058 0.058 67.554 <0.0001 
  
Error 102 0.087 0.001 
    
Corrected Total 103 0.145       
  
Computed against model Y=Mean(Y) 
     
Model parameters (Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - Borsa Italiana)): 
  
Source Value Standard 
error 







Intercept 0.004 0.003 1.390 0.168 -0.002 0.010 
 
EURO STOXX 600 returns 0.778 0.095 8.219 <0.0001 0.590 0.966 
 
        
Equation of the model (Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - Borsa Italiana)): 
 
Ferrari's returns (Italian Stock Exchange - Borsa Italiana) = 0.00398500181429666+0.77799056565738*EURO STOXX 600 returns 
 
2. Cost of Debt 
Estimating the synthetic cost of debt:  
 
Balance at 



























682,581,000 -- 682,581,000 282,113,000 -189,940,000 -82,000 -- 788,269,000 
Lease liabilities 673,000.00 63,535,000 64,208,000 14,788,000 -18,684,000 -- 184,000 60,496,000.00 
Borrowing from 
banks 
35,984,000 -- 35,984,000 -- -3,516,000 -71,000 549,000 32,946,000 
Other debt 9,820,000 -- 9,820,000 33,801,000 -21,479,000 -- 414,000.00 22,556,000 
Total debt 1,927,167,000 63,535,000 1,990,702,000 629,018,000 -549,014,000 4,287,000 14,744,000 
 
2,089,737,000 
Total debt at October 06, 2020 
     
2,757,067,000 
         
 










Implicit borrowing rate 
  




-- -- -- -- 1.590% 
   
 
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
   
Financial 
expenses 
44956.74 55048.82 65262.51 76697.27 89371.36 
   
 
SYNTHETICALLY ESTIMATED COST OF DEBT FOR FERRARI 
N.V.  
     
DATE OF ANALYSIS: DATA USED IS AS OF JANUARY 2020 
     
FOR NON-FINANCIAL SERVICE FIRMS 
ONLY 
      
SOURCE: ASWATH DAMODARAN (AVAILABLE IN <http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ratings.htm>, 
last access: Aug/15/2020.  
For developed market firms with market cap > $5 billion  
 
For all emerging market firms and developed market firms 
with market cap < $5 billion 
If interest coverage 
ratio is  
   
If interest coverage ratio is 
  
>  ≤ to  Rating is  Spread is  
 
>  ≤ to  Rating is  Spread is  
8.50 10,000 Aaa/AAA 0.63% 
 
12.50 10,000 Aaa/AAA 0.63% 
6.50 8.50 Aa2/AA 0.78% 
 
9.50 12.50 Aa2/AA 0.78% 
5.50 6.50 A1/A+ 0.98% 
 
7.50 9.50 A1/A+ 0.98% 
4.25 5.50 A2/A 1.08% 
 
6.00 7.50 A2/A 1.08% 
3.00 4.25 A3/A- 1.22% 
 
4.50 6.00 A3/A- 1.22% 
2.50 3.00 Baa2/BBB 1.56% 
 
4.00 4.50 Baa2/BBB 1.56% 
2.25 2.45 Ba1/BB+ 2.00% 
 
3.50 4.00 Ba1/BB+ 2.00% 
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2.00 2.25 Ba2/BB 2.40% 
 
3.00 3.50 Ba2/BB 2.40% 
1.75 2.00 B1/B+ 3.51% 
 
2.50 3.00 B1/B+ 3.51% 
1.50 1.75 B2/B 4.21% 
 
2.00 2.50 B2/B 4.21% 
1.25 1.50 B3/B- 5.15% 
 
1.50 2.00 B3/B- 5.15% 
0.80 1.25 Caa/CCC 8.20% 
 
1.25 1.50 Caa/CCC 8.20% 
0.65 0.80 Ca2/CC 8.64% 
 
0.80 1.25 Ca2/CC 8.64% 
0.20 0.65 C2/C 11.34% 
 
0.50 0.80 C2/C 11.34% 
-10,000 0.20 D2/D 15.12% 
 
-10,000 0.50 D2/D 15.12% 























Financial Analysis – Ferrari and Automotive Industry 
      
Company Revenue (in 
mn) 
COGs / Revenue EBITDA Margin EBIT Margin ROA ROE EPS 
Aston Martin £ 997,30 64% 18% 7% -3% -33% -£ 15,95 
BMW € 104.210,00 83% 13% 7% 2% 8% € 7,47 
Tesla $ 2.477,66 83% 12% 8% 0% 1% $ 0,04 
Daimler € 172.745,00 83% 7% 4% 1% 7% $ 3,65 
Volkswagen € 252.632,00 81% 16% 7% 3% 11% € 26,66 
Volvo € 431.980,00 76% 16% 11% 7% 25% € 17,02 
Renault € 55.537,00 80% 11% 4% 0% 0% -€ 0,52 
FIAT € 108.187,00 86% 11% 6% 4% 15% € 2,73 
Peugeot € 74.731,00 79% 11% 6% 5% 17% € 3,40 
GM $ 137.237,00 81% 11% 6% 3% 17% € 4,82 
Ford $ 143.599,00 94% 11% 4% 2% 14% € 1,19 
Ferrari € 3.766,00 48% 34% 24% 13% 47% € 3,71 
Average -- 78% 14% 8% 3% 11% -- 
Source: Reuters, elaborated by the student.  
Financial Analysis – Ferrari and Luxury Industry 
Company Revenue COGs / 
Revenue 
EBITDA Margin EBIT Margin ROA ROE EPS 
LVMH € 53.670,00 34% 26% 21% 7% 20% € 14,23 
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Moncler € 1.627,70 22% 35% 30% 10% 17% € 1,42 
Kering € 15.883,50 26% 38% 30% 13% 32% € 25,59 
Richemont € 14.238,00 41% 17% 11% 3% 6% € 1,74 
Hermes € 6.883,40 31% 40% 34% 18% 25% € 14,55 
Salvatore 
Ferragamo 
€ 1.372,45 35% 24% 11% 6% 12% € 0,52 
Ralph Lauren $ 6.159,80 41% 15% 10% 10% 17% € 6,56 
Burbury £ 2.633,10 35% 17% 16% 11% 24% £ 78,70 
Pandora 21.868,00 
kr. 
27% 28% 27% 14% 51% 30,10 kr. 
Brunello Cucinelli € 608,59 41% 28% 14% 7% 18% € 0,77 
Ferrari € 3.766,00 48% 34% 24% 14% 49% € 3,71 
Average -- 35% 27% 21% 10% 25% -- 
Source: Reuters, elaborated by the student. 
As it may be seen, on the above tables, Ferrari is not comparable with every luxury peer. Taking into consideration the level of exclusiveness 
translated into higher multiples and margins, filtering the initial luxury industry to find better comparability with Ferrari’s reality would leave us with 
LVMH, Hermes, Salvatore Ferragamo and Brunello Cucinelli. With this bias, it is possible to value Ferrari with the P/E 2021YE multiple, according 
to estimates from Reuters. Since this is a weak method to value Ferrari due to the firm’s peculiarities, it may be seen as an extra tool to confirm 
the DCF – FCFF, APV and EVA obtained Target Price for Ferrari.  
Ferrari’s Relative Valuation with Auto and Luxury Peers 
Industry average P/E 2021YE EV/EBITDA 
2021YE 
EV/EBIT 2021YE EV/Sales 2021YE 
Auto  31.14 14.52 14.89 2.32 
Luxury 48.99 18.91 30.54 6.04 
Ferrari 47.39 30.02 34.51 8.78 
Ferrari's Relative Price to Auto €127.64 €59.53 €61.05 €9.52 
Ferrari's Relative Price to Luxury  €176.43   €107.41  €147.61   €119.43 
 
Appendix 9: Business and Corporate Structure 
Ferrari’s Board of Directors is composed by 11 directors, including both executive and non-executive, and is responsible for the management and 
for the strategic direction of the Group. Since Ferrari’s IPO in 2015, the firm’s officers have been stable.  
 
Name Age Current Position Bio Officer/Director In Position 
Mr. John Elkann 44 Executive Chairman 
of the Board 
 1 Year 1 Year 
Mr. Louis Camilleri 65 Chief Executive 
Officer, Executive 
Director 
 5 Years 2 Years 
 
Mr. Piero Ferrari 75 Non-Executive Vice 
Chairman of the 
Board 
 33 Years 33 Years 
Mr. Antonio Piccon 56 Chief Financial 
Officer 
 2 Years 2 Years 
Mr. Michele 
Antoniazzi 
51 Chief Human 
Resource Officer 
 4 Years 4 Years 
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Mr. Michael Leiters 49 Chief Technology 
Officer 
 7 Years 7 Years 
Mr. Enrico Galliera 54 Chief Marketing and 
Commercial Officer 
 10 Years 10 Years 
Mr. Carlo Daneo 52 General Counsel  5 Years 5 Years 
Mr. Mattia Binotto 51 Managing Director 
Gestione Sportiva 
and Team Principal 
Scuderia Ferrari 
 2 Years 2 Years 
Mr. Nicola Boari, 
Ph.D.  
50 Chief Brand 
Diversification 
Officer 
 11 Years 2 Years 
Mr. Flavio Manzoni 55 Chief Design Officer  11 Years 2 Years 
Ms. Jane Reeve -- Chief 
Communication 
Officer 
 1 Year 1 Year 
Mr. Vincenzo 
Ragazzoni 
57 Chief Manufacturing 
Officer 












 -- -- 
Mr. Eddy Cue 56 Non-Executive 
Independent 
Director 
 -- -- 
Mr. Sergio Duca 73 Non-Executive 
Independent 
Director 
 10 Years 10 Years 
Mrs. Maria  Grieco 68 Non-Executive 
Independent 
Director 
 -- -- 
Mr. Adam Keswick 47 Non-Executive 
Independent 
Director 
 -- -- 
Ms. Elena Zambon 56 Non-Executive 
Independent 
Director 
 -- -- 
 
 
Appendix 10: Porter’s Five Forces 
Bargain Power of Buyers: Low 
Cars in LPCI are highly unique. Buyers may choose among GT and Sports Cars from different manufacturers, but each has her own features that 
many times are incomparable with the ones present in competitors’ models. Buyers are price-takers, and despite the comparability in car features 
produced by different peers, Ferrari’s buyers tend to be loyal despite their low power to negotiate or switch-off products easily. From the buyer 
perspective, there are not considerable threats regarding the customer’s power over the firm.  
Bargain Power of Suppliers: Medium 
Bargain power of suppliers may be considered medium to Ferrari but may be lower to other peers. As an independent luxury performance car 
manufacturer producing low volumes, Ferrari concentrates part of the buys with the same suppliers, which tend to have some power to negotiate 
with Ferrari that is higher compared with their power to negotiate with peers that are part of larger automotive groups, for instance. Ferrari’s cars 
are special and brings specific features, and as a result, some suppliers in Ferrari’s supply chain are the only source of that supply, decreasing 
Ferrari’s power and bringing a medium risk of disruptions in supply chains. 
Rivalry among Existing Peers: Medium 
Competition is high in LPCI, despite the fact of each car to be unique. This is because potential buyers are limited: HNWIs constitute a very small 
number of people if you consider this group as the potential buyers. In this sense, convincing new customers that your models are the best ones 
is now an easy task, and the few competitors tend to fight for being considered the best class available. Even tough, Ferrari  has been producing 
very unique cars, which are not easily comparable with the competitors. The rivalry is medium, and Ferrari is well shaped to keep succeeding in 
keep itself on the pole-position in LPCI, which has been the source of higher premiums.  
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Threat of New Entrants and Substitutes: Low 
The risk of new entrants in LCPI is low, since initial capital is high, R&D capabilities a must, and a high level of regulation is present. Possible new 
entrants are car manufacturers whose portfolios do not contain LPC. The industry is highly regulated, which also favors companies that already 
produce cars. The high level of exclusivity cannot be built from the night to the day, and new entrants would take a long time to prove their products 
with very exigent customers, whose willingness to switch-off from one brand to other is low. Economies of scale and scope are limited in LPCI, 
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Recommendation System 
 Level of Risk SELL REDUCE HOLD/NEUTRAL BUY STRONG BUY 
High Risk 0%≤ >0% & ≤10% >10% & ≤20% >20% & ≤45% >45% 
Medium Risk -5%≤ >-5% & ≤5% >5% & ≤15% >15% & ≤30% >30% 
Low Risk -10%≤ >-10% & ≤0% >0% & ≤10% >10% & ≤20% >20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
